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CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS OVER
UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA?
MICHAEL C. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping once famously urged that resolution of
disputes with China's neighbors over uninhabited islands be put off to a later
generation, stating: "Our generation is not wise enough to find common language
on this question. The next generation will certainly be wiser."' Such sage advice
seemed practical at the time, freeing China and its neighbors to focus on more
pressing trade and economic development efforts. The wisdom of continuing
deferral of the disputes over uninhabited islands is now in doubt, at least when
peaceful alternatives may be considered. Beyond the rapid economic development
and the consequent explosion of resource demands that has occurred since Deng
uttered these words, technological development has made these deep seabed
resources more readily accessible.2 Added to this has been China's rapid economic
development and associated military rise, encouraging China's expanded attention
to territorial sovereignty and resource claims in its periphery.3 Increased military
confrontations over disputed islands have added to the urgency of this matter, and
an impasse has prevailed .
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1. CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA'S
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 38 (2004); see also CHI-KIN LO, CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES: THE CASE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS 171 (2003).
2. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EAST CHINA SEA I (Sept. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/eastchina-sea/east china sea.pdf (stating although the
East China Sea may have abundant oil and natural gas resources, unresolved territorial disputes
continue to hinder exploration and development in the area); Michael T. Klare, Island Grabbing in
Asia: Why the South China Seas are So Tense, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 38093/michael-t-klare/island-grabbing-in-asia.
3. Asia's Balance of Power: China's Military Rise, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212; Toshi Yoshihara, War By Other Means: China's Political
Uses of Seapower, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 26, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/26/war-by-other-
means-chinas-political-uses-of-seapower; Kurt Campbell, Trouble at Sea Reveals the New Shape of
China's Foreign Policy, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2014/07/22/trouble-at-
sea-reveals-the-new-shape-of-chinas-foreign-policy.
4. Japan Defense Paper Warns of China's 'Dangerous Acts' in Sea, Air, TIMES INDIA, Aug. 5,
2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Japan-defence-paper-wams-over-Chinas-
dangerous-acts-in-sea-air/articleshow/39663923.cms; Chinese Ships Advance in Waters Near Diaoyus
Defying Japan's White Paper Warning, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 6, 2014, 2:03 PM,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1567585/defying-japans-warning-chinese-ships-advance-
waters-near-diaoyus.
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This article focuses on comparable disputes over two groups of uninhabited
islands-the Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) Islands and the Diaoyu (Senkaku in
Japanese) Islands-that may be pivotal to unraveling a series of volatile maritime
disputes between Japan and South Korea, on the one hand, and Japan and China,
on the other. The Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located
respectively in the Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea in Korea) and the East
China Sea. This narrowing of the topic to these two particular island disputes and
related maritime issues is offered in the hope that these two sets of disputes may
hold some keys to the wider, more factually complex debate stretching across the
region, both north to the Yellow Sea and south to the South China Sea.5 At the
same time, there is hope the Japan-South Korea dispute may inform options
available for the China-Japan dispute.
In the face of the current impasse, the challenge is to identify those aspects of
these island disputes that can be solved so as to ultimately facilitate more
comprehensive maritime solutions that may be achieved under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS").6 Toward this end, the following
six sections will discuss: first, the posture of the current disputes; second, some
international legal principles of relevance to the parties positions regarding
territorial claims to uninhabited islands and resource rights in adjoining seas; third,
the above-noted Japanese-South Korean dispute relating to the Dokdo/Takeshima
Islands; fourth, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; fifth,
the parties' positions regarding the related resource boundary claims; and, sixth,
concluding recommendations on how best to move past the current impasse.
Paradoxically, while resource concerns triggered a lot of the recent attention to
these disputes, nationalistic concerns over sovereignty engender more passion in
the disputants. The twin concern over sovereignty and resources has become an
increasing cause of conflict in the Asian region, making settlement of resource
claims without addressing the underlying sovereignty dispute increasingly
difficult.
5. See generally Andy Yee, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis
of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, 2 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 165 (2011). Both Japan
and South Korea have other sea resource boundary disputes with China. See e.g., Euan Graham, South
Korea's Maritime Challenges: Between a Rock anda Hard Base, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 063/2012,
Apr. 11, 2012, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO12063.pdf. The
Sino-Korean dispute over Leo Island (actually submerged rocks) has been especially contentious.
Terence Roehrig, South Korea-China Maritime Disputes: Toward a Solution, EASTAS[AFORUM.ORG,
Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/27/south-korea-china-maritime-disputes-toward-
a-solution; China Must Not Take Its Territorial Ambitions Too Far, CHOSUN ILBO, Sept. 26, 2012,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2012/09/26/2012092601283.html; Scores of Chinese
Fishing Boats Invade Korean Waters, CHOSUN ILBO, May 2,
2014,http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2014/05/02/2014050201344.html. Less relevant to
the present discussion are Japanese disputes with Russia over its northern Kuril Islands. Japan PM,
Putin Seek Progress on Islands Dispute, ABC NEWS AUSTL., Apr. 29, 2013,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-29/an-japan2c-russia-discuss-islands-dispute/4658814.
6. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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With this in mind, the final section offers a recommendation that reverses
both Deng Xiaoping's earlier sage advice and the favored international practice
under UNCLOS of interim resource settlements in the face of intractable territorial
disputes. Developing international customary law regarding claims to uninhabited
islands suggests the most effective avenue to unraveling these territorial and
maritime resource disputes is to first pay attention to peaceful resolution of the
island and related maritime sovereignty disputes. In the spirit of the gentle
removal of logs from the log-j am that characterizes these disputes, this effort might
ideally begin with third-party dispute resolution, preferably in the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ").
Careful consideration of the security and other alliances between South Korea
and Japan, as they react to China's rise and North Korea's aggression, may
encourage a process to resolve historical tensions and begin to outline relative
rights respecting these islands and the broader maritime claims. Beyond such
optimal approach, other lesser alternatives are also considered. These
recommendations recognize attempts to fully resolve the maritime resource
disputes have been held up for decades. Uncertainty over the islands' claims and
associated resource zones has spawned the back and forth posturing that inhibits
compromise over the maritime resource claims. The goal is to move the process
forward toward a solution before the more aggravated military conflict, which
many fear, ensues.
II. THE CURRENT POSTURE OF THE DISPUTES
A. Tit-for- Tat Provocations
The past couple of years have witnessed an explosion of confrontations
relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction over uninhabited islands and maritime
resource zones in the East and Southeast Asian maritime areas. The long list of
confrontations between the parties to the present discussion have included: the
Sino-Japanese dispute in late 2010 over the Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen
accused of ramming a Japanese patrol boat near the Japanese-administered
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea;7 the 2012 Japanese arrest and quick
release of fourteen Chinese civilians attempting to occupy Diaoyu/Senkaku, with
follow-on Japanese civilian occupation;8 the September 2012 Japanese purchase of
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese holder (characterized by
China as "nationalization"), which netted the largest anti-Japanese riots in China in
decades;9 Chinese patrol boats frequently confronting the Japanese Coast Guard
7. Japan-China Row over Ship Seizure, AUAZEERA (Sept. 9, 2010, 9:48 AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2010/09/20109963630504649.html.
8. Martin Fackler, Japan Holds 14 Chinese in Island Landing, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/world/asia/japanese-ministers-visit-tokyo-shrine.html?_r-0.
9. The Chinese government appears to manage the public discontent over Japan's purchase, first
turning it on and then turning it off, perhaps fearing a backlash against their own government. Keith
Bradsher, Martin Fackler, & Andrew Jacobs, Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China over Disputed Island,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/asia/japanese-activists-display-
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off Diaoyu/Senkaku;1° various threats of sanctions (under WTO "security
exceptions") or even war in the Chinese official press;"' Japan's scrambling of
fighter planes in response to Chinese warplanes flying near the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands. 12
That there has been a similar list of disputes in the South China Sea signals
that the reach of this tense situation goes well beyond the immediate area to
include: maritime patrol boat confrontations between China and its neighbors over
the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea;13 disputes in 2014 over a
Chinese drilling platform operating in waters generally thought to be in the
Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"), netting confrontations at sea and
large Vietnamese street protest;14 a dispute and then a now-failed compromise
between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal and China's building
of man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands.'5 While the present
essay will discuss prominent East China Sea disputes, those in the South China Sea
are equally compelling.
Any of these disputes risk conflagration across the region as various security
alignments are brought into play. Recent developments, with China employing
flag-on-disputed-island.html?hp (noting the demonstrations appeared sanctioned and chaperoned by
police). While Beijing accuses Japan of provoking China by nationalizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,
it appears the Japanese purchase from private owners was designed to avoid a purchase being
orchestrated by the more nationalistic Tokyo governor. Mar Yamaguchi, Tokyo Governor Says City
will Buy Disputed Islands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 17, 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/tokyo-
govemor-says-city-buy-150303483.html. See also Ed Zhang, China Lays into Japan over Naming of
Islets, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 31, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.scmp.com/article/991303/china-lays-japan-over-naming-islets.
10. Minnie Chan, PLA Puts Military Heat on Japan over Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/anicle/1035320/pla-puts-military-
heat-japan-over-diaoyu-islands.
11. An Baisong, Consider Sanctions on Japan, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 17, 2012, 7:53 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/17/content_15761435.htm (indicating a military
response should be a last choice); Jane Perlez, China Alters Its Strategy in Diplomatic Crisis with
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/asia/china-alters-its-
strategy-in-dispute-with-japan.html?pagewanted=all& r-0.
12. Julian Ryall, Japanese Jets Ordered to Diaoyus 160 Times in Nine Months, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013, 6:10 PM, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 136249/japanese-
jets-ordered-diaoyus- 160-times-nine-months.
13. lan Storey, ASEAN and the South China Sea: Movement in Lieu of Progress, CHINA BRIEF,
Apr. 26, 2012, at 10, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx-ttnews /5 Btt-news / 5D=39305&tx-ttnews%5BbackPid%5 D-58
9&no cache= I #. V Frdu n FXt.
14. Edward Wong, Analysts Say China May Try to Use Manmade Islands to Bolster Bid for
Economic Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014,
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/analysts-say-china-may-try-to-use-manmade-islands-
to-bolster-bid-for-economic-developmentl; NGUYEN THI LAN ANH, XISHA (PARACEL) ISLANDS: A
REJOINDER (2014), available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO 14117.pdf.
15. Kristine Kwok & Minnie Chan, China Plans Artificial Island in Disputed Spratlys Chain in
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drones near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and declaring an Air Defense
Identification Zone ("ADIZ") to overlap the Japanese controlled islands, have
raised ominous concerns about miscalculations leading to military conflict.
16
Chinese officials and commentators have invoked World War II history to suggest
a rising tide of Japanese militarism.17 The perceived threat from a now rising
China may appear more imminent to its neighbors.
A common thread in many of these disputes is China's military rise and
consequent assertiveness.18 There have been threatening domestic calls for China
to enhance its sea power in order to deal more forcefully with these challenges. 19
These have included what has been called a "near sea doctrine" China announced
five years ago, where China declared an aim to exercise greater control over the
East and South China Seas.20  There have in fact been several incursions by
16. Christopher Bodeen, China Warns Foreign Planes Entering Defense Zone, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 24, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/china-wams-foreign-planes-entering-defense-zone-
064540562.html; Wendell Minnick, Fact Sheet: China's Air Defense Zone, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 2,
2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131124/DEFREG03/311240004/Fact-Sheet-China-s-Air-
Defense-Zone; US Criticizes New China Zone, Vows to Defend Japan, SPACEWAR.COM, Nov. 23, 2013,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_criticizes-new China-zone vows to defend Japan 999.html;
Press Release, Ministry of Nat'l Def., PRC, Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun's Response to Questions
on the Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (Nov. 23, 2013), available
at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2013-11/23/content 4476149.htm; Chris Buckley, China Claims Air
Rights over Disputed Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/china-wams-of-action-against-aircraft-over-disputed-
seas.html?_r-0; Former Chinese Commander Warns of War If Japan Shoots Down Drone,
BLOOMBERG News, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-04/former-chinese-
commander-warns-of-war-if-japan-shoots-down-drone.html; Martin Fackler, Japan Rejects China's
Claim to Air Rights Over Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/japan-rejects-chinas-claim-to-air-rights-over-disputed-
islands.html?ref-international-home; Ely Ratner, China Undeterred and Unapologetic,
WARONTHEROCKS.COM, June 24, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/china-undeterred-and-
unapologetic/.
17. Zhang Junsai, Abe's Militarism Defies History, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 9, 2014,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/abes-militarism-defies-history/articlel 6244968/.
18. Edward Wong, China Navy Reaches Far, Unsettling the Region, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15china.html? r-0; Asia's Balance of Power, supra
note 3; China's Maritime Ambitions Making Waves in Pacific, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 10, 2013,
3:35 AM, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/82919/chinas-maritime-ambitions-making-waves-in-pacific-
2/. China's inclusion of the islands among its "core interest" has also caused unease. China Officially
Labels Senkakus a 'Core Interest', JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 27, 2013,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/27/national/china-officially-labels-senkakus-a-core-
interest/#.VFOB3 nF Vo; Senkakus a 'Core Interest,' Chinese Military Scholar Tells Japan, JAPAN
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20l3/08/20/national/politics-
diplomacy/senkakus-a-core-interest-chinese-military-scholar-tells-japan/#.VFOEO-nF-Vp; Phillip C.
Saunders, China's Juggling Act: Balancing Stability and Territorial Claims, PACNET No. 33 (Center
for Strategic & Int'l Studies), Apr. 29, 2014, at I, available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/Pacl433.pdf.
19. Hao Zhou, China Yet to be a Sea Power, GLOBALTIMES.CN, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/701700.shtml.
20. Michael J. Green, Negotiating Asia's Troubled Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/opinion/negotiating-asias-troubled-waters.html?_r-=0.
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Chinese Coast Guard, marine surveillance ships, and aircrafts near these islands
and others in the South China Sea.21 A prominent Japanese retired admiral has
even argued, beyond seabed resource claims, China's real goal in seeking to
control the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea is to create a
submarine safe-zone in the South China Sea to enhance unfettered access to the
open ocean by nuclear submarines, as a deterrent against the U.S.22 Others take the
view that China is simply in a renewal phase aimed at expanding its sovereign
territory and resurrecting its more glorious past.23 Whichever theory is correct,
China's military posturing raises risks both for the disputants and for U.S.
involvement.24 Concerns about full civilian control of China's military have
enhanced the perceived sense of risk in military encounters at sea.25 Diplomatic
efforts to contain this risk have born very little fruit.
26
These risks have also produced escalation on the Japanese side. After years
of somewhat stagnant military budgets, Japan has announced defense budget
27increases and strategic shifts to counter Chinese incursions. It has revised its
21. China's New Coastguard Flexes Muscles near Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
26, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/11291292/chinese-coastguard-enters-japanese-
controlled-waters-raising-tensions; Three Chinese Vessels Enter Territorial Waters Near Senkakus,
JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/28/national/three-chinese-
vessels-enter-territorial-waters-near-senkakus/#.VFOfUPnF Vo; Barbara Demick, China Wages Stealth
War in Asian Waters, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/27/world/la-fg-
china-maritime-20130327; Japan PM Abe Warns China of Force Over Islands Landing, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22260140.
22. Reiji Yoshida, Bei.ing's Senkaku Goal: Sub 'Safe Haven' in South China Sea, JAPAN TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/07/national/beijings-senkaku-goal-sub-safe-
haven-in-south-china-sea/.
23. John Lee, China's Dream of Rebirth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1166737/chinas-dream-rebirth?page=all; Holly
Morrow, It's Not About the Oil-It's About the Tiny Rocks, FOREIGN POL'Y, Aug. 4, 2014,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/04/it-s not about the oil it s about the tiny rocks_c
hina south china seajapanvietnam (arguing that these disputes are not about oil but are primarily
about sovereignty).
24. John Pomfret, Japan and China's Island Argument is a U.S. Concern, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
2013, http ://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/j apan-and-chinas-island-argument-is-a-us-
concem/2013/02/05/fbc7ed62-6999-11e2-af53-7b2b2a7510a8_story.html; U.S. Airs Concern over
China's Radar Locking on Japanese Defense Ship, ASIA NEWS MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2013; Insight: China
Increased Belligerence after U.S. Aircraft Deployment near Senkakus, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 6, 2013,
http://ajw.asahi.con/article/asia/AJ201302060077.
25. Masahiro Matsumura, Praetorian China?, PROJECT-SYNDICATE.ORG (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-loss-of-civilian-control-over-the-military-by-
masahiro-matsumura.
26. Showing Off to the World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21631107-capital-about-host-president-xi-jinpings-diplomatic-
coming-out-party-showing.
27. Yuka Hayashi, Japanese General Seeks to Reinforce Defenses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2013,
http://onltine.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424127887324581504578238473997165346; see generally
JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pubt/w_paper/2013.html) (reflecting a shift in defense interest from the North
to the islands in the Southwest).
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defense strategy to focus its forces more to the south to defend against potential
Chinese attacks on its islands.28 Japan has also stepped up efforts to develop a
stealth fighter jet to match the J-20 stealth fighter recently tested by China.29 Japan
has engaged in war games and placed missiles on nearby Pacific gateway islands.30
It has also attempted to contain the problem by reaching a separate agreement with
the Republic of China ("ROC") to allow Taiwanese fishermen to fish near the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands just beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea boundary.31
Some disputants have lodged formal protests or other submissions to the
United Nations. In Southeast Asia, these complaints relate to China's allegedly
excessive resource claims and the so-called "nine dotted lines" claim to most of the
South China Sea.32 China has reacted to the most aggressive of these, relating to
the filing by the Philippines, by refusing to participate and put forth its own
arbitrator, requiring the President of the U.N. Tribunal to select a judge on behalf
of China.33 After the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku crises, China instituted its own filing
28. See Hayashi, supra note 27.
29. David Axe, Japan's Stealth Fighter Gambit, DIPLOMAT, June 23, 2011,
http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/japans-stealth-fighter-gambit/?allpages=yes.
30. Japan putting Missiles on Pacific Gateway Islands, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM, Nov. 7, 2013,
http://www.channeinewsasia.com/news/specialreports/mh370/news/japan-putting-missiles-
on/878190.html.
31. China Angered as Japan, Taiwan Sign Fishing Agreement, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/us-china-japan-taiwan-idUSBRE93909520130410; Minnie
Chan, Taiwan Would 'Expel' Mainland Trawlers under Japan Fishing Deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Apr. 10, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1211568/china-angered-japan-taiwan-sign-
fishing-agreement?page=all.
32. Though China has formally opted out of compulsory jurisdiction for maritime boundaries and
military activities, as permitted under UNCLOS, the Philippines has filed a claim under UNCLOS to
Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China). China Rejects Manila Claims over South
China Shoal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 18, 2012,
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2018004165_apassouthchinasea.html. Beyond these island
disputes there are numerous issues related to China's hotly disputed claims to nearly all of the South
China Seas within the infamous "nine dotted lines", which Wang Gungwu traces to China's attempted
accession of Japanese imperial claims following World War II. Wang Gungwu, China and the Map of
Nine Dotted Lines, STRAITS TIMES, July 11, 2012, http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-
report/china/story/china-and-the-map-nine-dotted-lines-20120711.
33. Greg Torode, For South China Sea Claimants, a Legal Venue to Battle China, REUTERS, Feb.
12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-china-vietnam-idUSBREAI C04R20140213.
The arbitration judicial panel was fully constituted on April 24, 2013, to include judges from Sri Lanka
(president), France, Germany, Netherlands, and Poland. See Greg Torode, Manila to Tackle Sea Row
'With or Without China' at UN, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/ 1154951/manila-tackle-sea-row-or-without-china-un; Verna
Yu, Beijing Looks Like A 'Bully' By Refusing Arbitration of South China Sea, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1245471/beijing-looks-bully-rejecting-
arbitration-south-china-sea-issue; Raissa Robles, Philippines Seeks UN arbitration over South China
Sea Disputes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1234952/philippines-seeks-un-arbitration-over-south-china-sea-
disputes. The arbitration is expected to take several years, leaving further opportunity to attempt
settlement. China has refused to appear, though the tribunal is going forward. Be'ing Rejects Tribunal
Request for Plea Response, TAIPEI TIMES, June 5, 2014,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/arehives/2014/06/05/2003592024. Though not formally
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with the U.N., indicating its base points and strait baselines to claim territorial seas
and possibly associated resource zones for the disputed islands.34 China has since
proclaimed its intention to patrol claimed areas now under the administration of
other states. Such Chinese proclamations have included reported regulations on
vessels in China's territorial seas, issued by the responsible Hainan People's
Congress.36 It has been argued that enforcement of such regulations through
seizure of a foreign vessel may open China up to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"), which has disavowed
jurisdiction in maritime delimitation disputes.37 These official Chinese actions, in
conjunction with official encouragement of anti-Japanese demonstrations, not to
mention encouragement for Chinese fishing and patrol vessels to enter the disputed
areas, surely contribute to a volatile situation.
38
appearing, China did publish a position paper objecting to jurisdiction in the dispute on
December 7, 2014. POSITION PAPER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON THE MATTER OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION INITIATED
BY THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cnmfa eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtm.
34. GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC, GOVERNMENT SUBMISSION TO THE U.N., Statement of the
Government of the PRC on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of Diaoyu Dao and Its Affiliated Islands
(Sept. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/chn-mzn89-2012
_e.pdf; China's Statement over Diaoyu Islands, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Sept. 11, 2012,
http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7943813.html; Continental Shelf Notification, U.N. DOALOS,
Receipt of the Submission Made by the People's Republic of China to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, CLCS.63.2012LOS (Dec. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcsnew/submissionsfiles/chn63_12/clcs 63 2012.pdf. Base lines refer
to the inland boundary of the territorial sea from which all other zones are measured; when coast are
uneven or for islands strait baselines may be used under certain conditions. See J. Ashley Roach,
China's Straight Baseline Claim: Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 17 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1 (2013), available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/7/china / E2 /80 / 99s-straight-baseline-claim-senkaku-
diaoyu-islands. UNCLOS Article 5 provides, "except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the
normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." UNCLOS Article 7 allows for
strait baselines, (1) "in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into," and (2) "if there is
a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity." UNCLOS Article 46 allows strait
baselines for archipelagic states to outer most islands.
35. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Dangerous Waters, Why China's Dispute with Japan is More
Dangerous than You Think, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 17, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/17/dangerous waters.
36. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 776, 113th Cong. §2(27) (2013).
37. Ben Blanchard & Manuel Mogato, Chinese Police Plan to Board Vessels in Disputed Seas,
REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/us-china-seas-
idUSBRE8AS05E20121129. Sam Bateman argues that although China has opted out of compulsory
jurisdiction for maritime delimitation, it seizure of a vessel in contested waters claimed as territorial
waters in a seizure dispute could open the door to the boundary delimitation issues necessary to
determine the appropriateness of the seizure. Sam Bateman, China's New Maritime Regulations. Do
They Accord with International Law?, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 220/2012, Dec. 5, 2012, available at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/COI 2220.pdf.
38. Minnie Chan, China Vows to Protect 2,000 Fishing Boats Heading Towards Diaoyus, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039353/china-vows-
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The discussion of these maritime disputes in several international forums
signals enhanced likelihood of further confrontation. Discussions at the March
2012 meeting of China's National People's Congress tended to show China's
determination to press its maritime claims with even greater determination.39 As
President Obama restated in Tokyo in April 2014, the U.S. is committed to defend
Diaoyu/Senkaku under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security.40  This frequently stated commitment, endorsed by congressional
resolution in late 2012, no doubt contributes to the military risk associated with
this issue.41  Japan's hedging against China's volatile threats also includes
increased security alignments with other threatened states.42 While there have
protect-2000-fishing-boats-heading-towards-diaoyus. There has generally been less agitation on the
Japanese side. Julian Ryall, Japanese Unmoved by Diaoyus Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 18,
2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039350/japanese-unmoved-diaoyus-row?page=all.
That Beijing frequently employs a people's war strategy of using ostensibly private fishing boats for
quasi-military purposes as "fisheries patrols" off Senkaku/Diaoyu poses a particular risk of military
confrontation. Will Clem, Use Fisheries Patrols to Tighten Grip on Diaoyus. Official Says, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/article/732654/use-fisheries-patrols-tighten-grip-
diaoyus-official-says; Mark McDonald, Will China Arm its Fishermen to Protect a 'Core Interest'?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/will-china-arm-its-
fishermen-to-protect-a-core-interest/? r-0. Beyond military tensions there have even been civilian
boycotts of Japanese goods. Ben Blanchard & Xiaoyi Shao, China Says Tensions with Japan Likely to
Hurt Trade, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-china-japan-
idUSBRE88C04620120913; Edward Wong, China's Hard Line: 'No Room for Compromise', N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/asia/china.html.
39. Li Mingjiang, China's Rising Maritime Aspirations: Impact on Beijing's Good-Neighbour
Policy, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 053/2012, Mar. 28, 2012, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CO 12053 .pdf.
40. Kristine Kwok, Obama Reassures Japan over Diaoyu Islands, but Warns Against Provoking
China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 24, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1496261 /obama-reassures-japan-over-islands-warns-against-
provoking-china?page=all.
41. HITOSHI TANAKA, POLITICIZING THE SENKAKU ISLANDS: A DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY
2 (2012), available at http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAU7-3.pdf. This defense treaty coverage was
emphasized again in early 2013. Atsushi Matsuura, Clinton Sends Warning to China over Senkakus,
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Jan. 21, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.4thmedia.org/2013/0l/china-strongly-
challenges-us-comments-about-the-diaoyu-islands/. That the U.S. has also recently committed to
increased missile defense for Japan and to deploy drones over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands increases the
military significance of these commitments. Thom Shanker & Ian Johnson, US Accord with Japan over
Missile Defense Draws Criticism in China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/world/asia/u-s-and-japan-agree-on-missile-defense-
system.html?ref global-home. J. Michael Cole, US to Deploy Drones over Diaoyutais, TAIPEI TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/08/08/2003539722; US Backing
May Prove Costly for Japan, GLOBAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/73345l .shtml.
42. Japan, Vietnam to Deepen Security Ties Amid China's Growing Assertiveness, MAINICHI, Jan.
18, 2013,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130120053829/http:/mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130
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been calls to prepare for war on both sides, the majority opinion is that China and
Japan will not risk an all-out war.43
Efforts to contain the dispute have also been evident. In August 2012, the
Beijing government asked that the Japanese government follow "three no's":
Japanese nationals should not land on the disputed islands, Japan should not
develop resources around the island, and Japan should not construct any buildings
on the islands.44 Internet users in China attacked the government for being weak.45
In late 2013, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, speaking before the U.N.
General Assembly, sought to cool down these intense disputes by re-invoking
Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum about the time not now being ripe to address
46these issues, though he insisted Japan at least acknowledge the dispute. In 2014
Washington, Manila, Beijing, and Tokyo backed a code of conduct to prevent
conflict at sea that has tried to reduce the discussed risks by banning radar-locking
of weaponry and setting out a reporting mechanism when naval vessels meet
unexpectedly in sea lanes.47
The danger of Sino-Japanese military miscalculation has, nevertheless,
become increasingly evident in the tit-for-tat military moves of both sides. China
viewed the Japanese arrest of fishing boat captains in Japanese-claimed waters and
the naming of the islands claimed by China as provocative.48 China has increased
official patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, enhancing the risk of
confrontation.49  On two occasions, the Chinese were reported to have locked
Tour Stresses Regional Tension, GLOBAL TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756023.shtml.
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stakes-stand-between-japan-and-china-wont-come-war?page=all; Chi-yuk Choi, PLA Officials Say
Troops are to Prepare for War Amid Territorial Disputes with Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
16, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 128164/pla-officials-say-troops-are-prepare-war-
amid-territorial-disputes-japan.
44. Bejing to Issue "Three Nos " To Japan over Diaoyutais, WANT CHINA TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012,
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120830000089&cid= 1101.
45. Id.
46. Atsushi Okudera, Chinese Foreign Minister Takes to Japan in U.N. Speech, ASAHI SHIMBUN,
Sept. 28, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind-news/politics/AJ201309280060.
47. Teddy Ng & Julian Ryall, Beijing Backs Code to Prevent Conflict at Sea Along with US and
Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 22, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1494736/china-among-21 -nations-back-code-prevent-
unintended-conflict-sea.
48. Ed Zhang, China Lays into Japan Over Naming of Islets, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31,
2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/991303/china-lays-japan-over-naming-islets; Teddy Ng, New
Maritime Clash Threatens Sino-Japan Ties, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://www.scmp.com/arlicle/984181 /new-maritime-clash-threatens-sino-japan-ties; China's
Contradictory Approach to Arrest of Fishermen, CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 10, 2011,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2011/11/10/2011111001144.html.
49. Austin Ramzy, Tensions with Japan Increase as China Sends Patrol Boats to Disputed
Islands, TIME, Sept. 14, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/09/14/tensions-with-japan-increase-as-china-
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weapons-guiding radar on Japanese vessels, accompanied by Chinese denials.
5
There have also been reports of China using drones to defend its claims in the East
China Sea and reports of China's intentions to increase patrols even further, to
which Japan is likewise preparing defensive measures.
51
What started with the Japanese government reaching agreement with the
private Japanese owners to buy and nationalize the islands, to head off plans of
Japanese right-wing politicians, garnered a heated Chinese response and has
escalated into the central dispute between these two trading partners.5 2  The
Chinese government hardly appreciated the Japanese official's motive to
undermine a purchase by the more right-wing Governor of Tokyo, who would
surely have engaged in other provocative acts on the islands.5 3 China sometimes
characterizes its claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as "core
national interests," suggesting non-negotiability, which has carried a menacing
tone.
54
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/asia/china-denies-directing-radar-at-japanese-
military.html? r=0.
51. Stephen Chen, Liaoning Sends Drones Over East China Sea, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
30, 2011, http://www.scmp.com/article/986333/liaoning-sends-drones-over-east-china-sea; Minnie
Chan, Be~iing's Patrol Missions Predicted to Rise, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 2012,
http://www.scmp.com/article/996069ibeijing-patrol-missions-predicted-rise; Defense Ministry Working
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POST, Sept. 16, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1037887/papers-go-
ballistic-over-diaoyu-dispute-japan (China proclaiming the sale illegal and invalid); Shi Jingtao, Hu
Warns Japan over Planned Purchase of Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 10, 2012,
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islands; Mure Dickie & Kathrin Hille, Japan Risks China's Wrath over Senkakus, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2012, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/Olbabbfa2a-tb2b- I lel -87ae-00144feabdc0.html.
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ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 17, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/media-japan-govt-agrees-
buy-disputed-islands. There have been reports that Japan had quietly notified China and tried to reach
an understanding as to the need for this purchase, but ultimately to no avail. Japan, China Were Close
to Preventing Current Turmoil Over Senkaku, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 22, 2013,
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind-news/politics/AJ201310220059.
54. Chinese General Luo Yuan said, "Core interests are not for debate, not for negotiation, and not
for trade off." This may say more about China efforts to aggressively assert its claims than reality since
the Chinese have frequently negotiated over core interest issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Ed
Zhang, A Hawkish General with a Dove's Heart and Mind, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 16, 2011,
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While the Japanese dispute with South Korea over Dokdo/Takashima has
been comparably less volatile, there have been tense moments and concern about
Japan-Korean defense alignments. While Japan is in possession of
Senkaku!Diaoyu, South Korea is in possession of Dokdo/Takeshima.55 The
Japanese Government took a dim view of the South Korean President paying a
personal visit to Dokdo/Takeshima.56 These South Korean initiatives have
seemingly encouraged China to seek alignment with South Korea against Japan.
57
These disputes have also reached beyond the immediate disputants, affecting
the security posture throughout the region. The U.S. defense obligations towards
Japan and South Korea along with tit-for-tat confrontations with China over U.S.
warship passage through these seas have raised the temperature.58 Vietnam and the
Philippines have beefed up their defenses in response to perceived Chinese
provocations59 that all parties are increasingly likely to arrest the others' fishermen
in claimed waters, which signals greater urgency across the region.60 The risk of
hot war from continuing failure to resolve certain territorial and resource claims in
the region is evident. Numerous efforts at discussion between the disputants have
not so far produced results.
61
55. Japan has administered the Senkaku Islands since the U.S. turned them over to Japan in
conjunction with Okinawa in 1972. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Senkaku Islands Q&A, June 5,
2013, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa 1010.html. South Korea has
held Dokdo continuously since the end of the Korean War but has claims going back centuries. Steven
J. Barber, Historical Facts about Korea's Dokdo Islands, HIST. FACTS ABOUT KOREA'S DOKDO
ISLAND, http://www.dokdo-takeshima.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
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CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1037174/arrival-us-
sub-philippines-sign-shifting-balance-naval-power. See, e.g., Hidemichi Katsumata, Japan's Strategy
Against Senkaku Island Dispute, JAPAN SECURITY WATCH, (Sept. 14, 2012, 12:20 PM),
http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10495 (translated by Kyle Mizokami) (providing a Japanese
perspective on this escalation). The U.S. has specifically indicated that its defense commitment reaches
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as Japanese administered territory. Paul Eckert, Treaty with Japan Covers
Islets in China Spat: U.S. Officials, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/20l2/09/20/us-china-japan-usa-idUSBRE88JIHJ20120920; PLA Warns
US Over Backing Japan in Diaoy'us Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 309056/china-military-tells-us-not-encourage-japan-over-
isles.
59. China's Maritime Disputes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-
pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing use-china sea InfoGuide (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014).
60. Choe Sang-hun, Chinese Fisherman Kills South Korean Coast Guardsman, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec.13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/asia/chinese-fisherman-kills-south-korean-
coast-guardsman.html; Kim Tae-jong, Illegal Chinese fishing boats to face heavier fines, KOREA
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/12/117 100109.html.
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B. Framing the Disputes
While the general fact of China's emergence as a great power may naturally
give rise to security concerns among China's neighbors, there can be little doubt
that peace would be better served by the elimination of risky disputes over
uninhabited islands and their surrounding seas. In regard to the disputes addressed
in this article, the cost of a war-like footing or war itself among three developed or
rapidly developing nations-China, Japan, and South Korea (along with the
U.S.)-would be enormous. The intra-Chinese dispute over Taiwan, while adding
further complexity, is set aside here, assuming some shared "Chinese" interests in
and mutual assertion of Chinese territorial claims on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait.62  The three states to be discussed primarily-China, Japan, and South
Korea-are all U.N. members and parties to the 1982 UNCLOS.63 Contributing to
this tense situation has been a tendency of all three states, especially China and
Japan, to push claims to base lines and related inland seas, territorial seas, and
resource zones that clearly go beyond those contemplated by UNCLOS. Without
clearly knowing who first started this cycle of confrontation and excess, the
strategy of all appears to be aimed at creating strong bargaining chips as a
counterweight to the other side's perceived excess claims. This brew of excess
claims and bargaining chips leads to ever-rising escalation of the disputes.
Earlier, in the spirit of Deng Xiaoping's above statement about the wisdom of
setting aside such sovereignty disputes and in the shadow of UNCLOS, it was
anticipated that temporary joint resource development zones and fisheries could be
negotiated while leaving the sensitive claims to uninhabited islands-territorial
land claims not being addressed in UNCLOS-for future resolution. This strategy
has proven largely fruitless, especially as to the vast oil and gas resources-with
visit-japanese-envoy-gives-chance-repair-ties; Japan-China 'Secret' Talks Held Over Island Row,
NATION, Oct. 16, 2013, http://nation.com.pk/intemational/16-Oct-2013/japan-china-secret-talks-held-
over-island-row; No Talks Unless Dispute Affirmed: China, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/09/21 /national/no-talks-unless-dispute-affirmed-
china/#.VHJg7VfF9tl. After a rather belligerent year China seems to be taking up a more conciliatory
approach, as has been evident with Vietnam as well. Teddy Ng, China, Vietnam to Set Up Sea
Exploration Group, China and Vietnam to Jointly Explore Waters, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 14,
2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/I 331106/china-vietnam-set-group-explore-disputed-
south-china-sea; Okudera, supra note 46.
62. Taiwan has indeed piped in occasionally to make its concerns known. Lawrence Chung, We
Vow Not to Give In Even an Inch, Taiwanese President Ma Tells Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 1036214/we-vow-not-give-even-inch-
taiwanese-president-ma-tells-japan.
63. When China signed and ratified UNCLOS it indicated several exceptions to its acceptance of
the treaty, including specifically that nothing in its accession should be construed to conflict in any way
with China's territorial law. Query whether this includes its claims within the nine dotted lines to the
entire South China Sea and too much of the continental shelf under the East China Sea? UNCLOS does
not include island claims. It is important to note that the U.S., though often a participant in these
disputes, is not yet a party to UNCLOS, though there has been pressure for U.S. ratification. Mark
Landler, Law of the Sea Treaty is Found on Capitol Hill, Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-found-on-capitol-hill-
again.html.
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only moderate contingent and not fully realized progress in a couple cases.64 The
reluctance of each party to surrender the leverage of their bargaining chips, which
ultimately include uninhabited islands and the surrounding seas, has spawned an
impasse. Added to these strategic considerations has been a strong dose of
nationalist sentiments on all sides agitating to defend the sovereign territorial
claims represented by the islands.65 The Chinese government has been especially
66tolerant (some say encouraging of) public anti-Japanese demonstrations. Perry
Link has noted that this may be a dangerous game for China; if such
demonstrations get out of hand they may backfire, turning the public wrath on
China itself.67
This situation leaves the parties with a strategic log-jam and the question
whether any logs can be gently removed from the disputes without collapsing into
a state of war. As the level of volatility has increased over time, the urgency of
this matter has increased. With some limited fishery exceptions, proposals to ease
the risk of conflict and settle the resource disputes have not yet been fruitful.68
That failure has led to the effort in this article to turn the process around and
consider avenues to addressing the more volatile island disputes first.
Absent the nationalistic passions, the claims to sovereignty over disputed
islands by all sides are coherent enough and could be easily resolved on the merits
under now-established customary international law through some third-party
dispute mechanism. Regarding Senkaku/Diaoyu, the impasse has long been the
refusal of both China and Japan to submit the dispute for third-party arbitration or
for Japan to even acknowledge there is a dispute to address. In the 2012 speech of
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65. Song Wenzhou, Nationalists Pose a Problem for Two Nations, CAIXIN ONLINE (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://english.caixin.com/2013-12-06/100614547.html.
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WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-both-encourages-and-
reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/dc8c I 88e-0 188-11 e2-9367-
4elbafb958db story.html?wprss=rss asia-pacific; Jessica Weiss, Nationalism and Anti-Japan
Demonstrations in China, MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/19/nationalism-and-anti-japan-demonstrations-in-china/.
China's encouragement of nationalistic demonstrations has been evident in China's ability to turn on
and off such demonstrations. China Tells Citizens not to hold Anti-Japan Protests, KYODO NEWS, Sept.
19, 2012, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/UPDATEI %3A+China+tells+citizens+not+to+hold+anti-
Japan+protests.-a0303222919. Such nationalism has especially been stoked by lingering sentiment
about Japan's invasions in World War II.
67. Perry Link, Beijing's Dangerous Game, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:45 PM),
hUtp://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/sep/20/beijings-dangerous-game. See also June Teufel
Dreyer, The Sino Stranglehold: How Badly Could the Chinese Protests Hurt Japan's Economy?,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 21, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21 /the sino stranglehold.
68. Teddy Ng, Japanese Propose Plan to Avoid Maritime Conflicts, Foreign Minister Seeks
Endorsements from Wen Jiabao and Wants to Resume Talks on Gas Fields, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 24, 2011, http://www.scmp.com/article/985738/japanese-propose-plan-avoid-maritime-conflicts.
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then Japanese Prime Minister Noda before the General Assembly he invoked
international law and seemingly signaled a willingness to submit the matter for
third-party arbitration, but China's long-standing refusal may have made this no
more than a safe ploy.69 More recently, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's
invocation of the rule of law as a basis to address these disputes met with Chinese
condemnation.70 China has never filed a general submission to the ICJ and has
especially resisted application of the ICJ or other third-party dispute mechanisms
for resolving disputes over sovereignty in similar circumstances.71 Respecting
Dokdo/Takeshima, South Korea likewise refuses such third-party dispute
assistance, claiming sovereignty as a justification.72 Japan has indicated a
willingness to submit the matter to the ICJ.
73
Because China, Japan, and South Korea are within 400 nautical miles ("nm")
of each other, all claimed resource zones in these enclosed seas overlap and require
the parties to negotiate an "equitable solution" as is required under UNCLOS.74
The claiming of excessive strait baselines from which to measure the territorial
seas by both Japan and China does not contribute to efforts to find such a solution.
In 2012, Beijing spurred increased tension by submitting to the U.N. strait
baselines for the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.75 Added to the impasse is the seeming
Japanese reluctance to openly accept that it cannot claim the 200nm resource zones
under UNCLOS for the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a limitation both
69. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda United Nations General Assembly Address, CSPAN
(Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?308405-4/japanese-prime-minister-
yoshihiko-noda-united-nations-general-assembly-address; Time to Put Inferiority Complex Behind Us,
GLOBAL TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735883.shtml.
70. Japan, Philiippines Using Rule of Law Pretext: China, XINHUA, June 27, 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/27/c_133443927.htm.
71. For example, its refusal of such third party dispute jurisdiction occurred when the Philippines
brought a similar dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly Islands to the International Tribunal
on the Law of the Sea. See, e.g., China Says Philippines Violates International Maritime Law in
Claiming South China Shoal, Fox NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/18/china-claims-philippines-is-violating-niaritime-law/;
Samantha Hoffman, Sino-Philippine Tension and Trade Both Rising amid Scarborough Standoff,
CHINA BRIEF, vol. 12/9, Apr. 27, 2012, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb 04 27.pdf; Greg Torode, Manila Action of South China
Sea Could Risk Aggravating Disputes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/ 1136191 /manilas-action-over-south-china-sea-could-risk-
aggravating-disputes.
72. See generally PILKYU KIM, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Xlibris, 2014).
73. J. Berkshire Miller, The ICJ and the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute, DIPLOMAT (May 13, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-icj-and-the-dokdotakeshima-dispute/.
74. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74 and 83.
75. This move was seen as a shift away from the previous policy of setting aside the dispute and
negotiating over joint exploration for energy resources and the declaration was accompanied by
increased presents of Chinese surveillance ships in the area. Teddy Ng, Beijing Gives UN Baselines for
Diaoyu Islands, Spurring Tension with Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 2012,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1037254/beijing-gives-un-baselines-diaoyu-islands-spurring-
tension-japan.
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China and Taiwan have acknowledged.76 But perhaps the biggest log in the log-
jam is China's claim to nearly all of the continental shelf between China and Japan
as part of what it claims is a natural prolongation of the continental shelf-even
though UNCLOS does not appear to allow such option in this situation of opposite
states within four hundred nautical miles of each other.7 7 China's similarly
excessive claim to nearly all of the South China Sea certainly does not encourage
hope that it would readily abandon this excessive claim in favor of a more
equitable solution.78 Efforts have been made by all sides to negotiate cooperative
arrangements in the form of joint resource zones envisioned by UNCLOS but with
limited success in implementation.
79
The pending island disputes have left the parties with too much uncertainty to
judge the reasonableness of any proposed resource allocation under UNCLOS
guidelines. Before UNCLOS South Korea and Japan were successful at
negotiating a joint resource development zone and they have since reached a
fisheries agreement.80  While China and Japan managed to reach a tentative
understanding, they labeled a "principled consensus," in June 2008 calling for joint
exploration and possible joint resource development in a 2700 square kilometer
area in the East China Sea, it is not clear whether this arrangement will be fully
developed and carried out-there being considerable mutual distrust.8' Japan and
China did reach a joint fisheries agreement covering a large area but excluding the
76. JON M. VAN DYKE, MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 61-62 (2009).
77. Id. at 58. China has submitted this continental shelf prolongation to the U.N. in a submission
entitled "Partial Submission Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200nm in the
East China Sea." China Makes U.N. Appeal for Maritime Claim, UPI, Dec.17, 2012,
http://www.upi.com/TopNews/Special/2012/12/17/China-makes-UN-appeal-for-maritime-claim/UPI-
60871355720880/.
78. South China Sea, Full Unclosure?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21551113/print.
79. Keyuan Zou, Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea, 27 Marine
Pol'y 125, 132-40 (2003) (includes the translated agreement as an appendix).
80. Choon-Ho Park, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, in Seabed Petroleum in
Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? 18, 18-22 (Selig S. Harrison ed., Woodrow Wilson Int'l. Ctr.
for Scholars, 2005), available at http://www.wiIsoncenter.org/sites/defaultlfiles/Asiapetroleum.pdf.
The Japan-Republic of Korea Agreement on Fisheries of 28 November 1998, entered into force on 22
January 1999, as revised on 17 March 1999.
81. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the Principled Consensus Reached between China and
Japan on the East China Sea (June 18, 2008), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa eng/xwfw 665399/s2510 _665401/2535 665405/t466675.shtml; Press
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs
Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Mari (June 18, 2008),
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fmpress/2008/6/0618.htm (regarding Cooperation
Between Japan and China in the East China Sea). The tentative nature of the June 18, 2008 "principled
consensus" was reflected in even the announcements of the arrangement being made in separate press
conferences and the arrangement itself leaving much open for further discussion, though it does provide
for cooperation in exploration and some joint investments.
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waters below twenty-seven degrees north near the SenkakulDiaoyu Islands.82 A
comprehensive resolution of these problems in the most sensitive areas seems to
elude the parties, as they fear surrendering critical bargaining chips, the disputed
islands being the most visible. Do current international legal principles offer a way
out of these impasses?
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: AN OVERVIEW
In the context of both sets of island disputes under discussion, the parties are
claiming historical title to the islands themselves and claiming rights to maritime
resources, including fisheries and oil, and gas deposits in the adjoining seas
between the claimant states8 3 Because the states in question are in close proximity
across their adjoining seas and the islands are at intermediate locations, the island
disputes have long been contingent factors for resolving the maritime disputes.
The discovery of very large oil and gas reserves-some have speculated possibly
on the scale of the Middle East or the North Sea-and disputes over the maritime
rights that attach to such small islands have created a web of competing claims.'
4
This complex web of claims has often featured the disputed islands and various
baseline claims as bargaining chips in the maze of competing resource claims,
making resolution of claims that would be relatively easy to resolve in legal terms
quite difficult. Elements of nationalism over the island claims have elevated the
political sensitivity of these disputes in ways that make political compromise hard
to achieve. The challenge has been to unravel these disputes to permit
development of sorely needed resources.
In regard to the disputes over these uninhabited islands and the associated
maritime boundary and resource claims under present discussion, two rapidly
evolving bodies of international law are implicated: territorial claims to
uninhabited islands, though not addressed by UNCLOS, are addressed by
customary international law; and, the maritime boundary and resource claims,
which are addressed rather comprehensively by UNCLOS and associated
jurisprudence. These two areas are considered in the following subsections.
A. Customary International Law Relating to Sovereignty over Uninhabited
Islands
Taking up island disputes first, it is a common characteristic of these disputes
over remote uninhabited islands in East Asia that a current occupant or claimant
vies for sovereignty with other claimants based on assertions of historical title. In
the absence of guiding international treaties, this issue has been governed by
82. Zou, supra note 79, at 133.
83. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 76; KIM, supra note 72.
84. While some have worried that the resource claims are exaggerated, they clearly do shape and
encourage territorial claims. Cary Huang, Diaoyu Islands Dispute about Resources Not Land, S. China
Morning Post, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1096774/diaoyu-islands-dispute-
about-resources-not-land. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., East China Sea (2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east-chinasea/east china sea.pdf; Roach, supra note 34,
at 1-5.
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customary international law. Measuring the viability of competing claims has long
involved sifting through remote historical records. As a result, the customary law
regarding territorial disputes over uninhabited islands is an area of law peculiarly
suited to resolution by the ICJ or international arbitral tribunals, although such
referral has proven especially sensitive for Asian states.
A number of guiding customary international law principles regarding
territorial claims to uninhabited islands have evolved through case law in recent
years. Such claims often implicate issues of historical discovery and effective
occupation. In the colonial period, for previously unclaimed islands (belonging to
no one, characterized as "terra nullius "), discovery and some formal official act to
perfect a claim of sovereignty were generally thought sufficient to establish a
claim. Because the pre-modern Asian international order may have lacked a
concept of territorial sovereignty, as this concept is understood today,6 further
difficulty was added to assessing such historical claims by regimes, which may
have lacked a habit to formally assert such claims. This difficulty was made worse
by an historical lack of serious interest in such remote islands in the days when
they offered fewer accessible resources.
87
By the mid-twentieth century the colonial era principles that rewarded
Western discovery began to fade. Modem international principles that rejected
colonialism and embraced modem notions of state sovereignty tended to give little
weight to ambiguous claims of historical title based on mere discovery or
proximity." A series of judicial decisions emphasized "effective occupation,"
which required some acts of administration and control beyond discovery.89 In the
Pedra Branca case, the ICJ emphasized "effective administration" in awarding the
island to Singapore.90  Effective administration can involve things such as
reclamations, regulation of fishing, construction and maintenance of structures, and
the investigation of accidents.
As one commentator emphasized, "active occupation and effective control
over territory supersedes ambiguous ancient title." 91 In the Sovereignty Over
Pulau Ligiton and Pulau Sipadan case, a dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia
over a group of very small islands encompassing just 0.13 square kilometers, the
85. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61.
86. Pilkyu Kim, Reassessment of Korea-Japan Relations: Acquisition of Dokdo/Takeshima and
"Effectiveness," Address Before the International Symposium on Dokdo Island (May 7, 2009)in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INT'L DOKDO SYMPOSIUM 2009, at 40-44; Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese
Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senka/c) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 Va. J. Int'l L.
221, 242-43 (1973-1974).
87. Cheng, supra note 86, at 246.
88. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61.
89. See Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty Over
Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.) (1931), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932); Island of Palmas
(U.S. v. Neth.), II R.I.A.A. 831 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1925).
90. Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau BatuPuteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, 11 170-72 (May 23).
91. Alexander M. Peterson, Sino-Japanese Cooperation i  the East China Sea: A Lasting
Arrangement? 42 Comell Int'l L.J. 441, 451 (2009).
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ICJ held that mere discovery was not enough, that "effective occupation,"
including displays of sovereignty and administration were essential to prove
ownership.92 The ICJ further held that failure to protest another state's occupation
93is de facto acceptance. The Court found effective occupation based on a
"continued display of authority [that] involves two elements each of which must be
shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise
or display of such authority.
" 94
As Greg Austin summarizes it, "[i]nternational customary law recognizes
acquisition of title to territory belonging to no-one (terra nullius) through
discovery, but this title remains inchoate and must be converted to a more
complete title through continued, peaceful and unprotested exercise of
sovereignty. " 95 Merely showing that some private nationals of the claiming state,
such as fishermen, visited the islands from time to time would be insufficient.
96
Austin notes that you can weigh the relative strength of competing historical
claims through analysis of historical, geographical, and administrative
circumstances.97 Case law also emphasizes a "critical date," such that acts affected
after the joining of a dispute cannot have a bearing on the sovereignty claim.
98
This "critical date" aspect, for example, would limit China's ability to perfect its
claims to contested islands in the South China Sea by building platforms or other
occupation activities.
Scholars and officials in East Asia often raise an irredentist problem,
questioning whether the heightened standards of "effective occupation" should be
applied to claims that arose in an earlier historical period before the West arrived
on the Asian scene.99 Such critics favor the application of standards contemporary
to the time the claim arose. °00 But this argument raises a policy problem for
current tribunals about whether to give effect to either colonialist or imperialist
standards that applied at the time of alleged ancient discovery. The better view
appears to require that some standards of effective occupation be applied even to
claims originating in ancient times. Ancient claims also face a problem of proof
92. Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligiton and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
625 (Dec. 17).
93. Id. 1 148.
94. ld. [1134.
95. GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY FORCE AND
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 36 (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1998). In this context terra nullius generally
refers to territory not ruled by a recognized state, which could be the consequence of no previous
discovery and claim or abandonment of a previous claim.
96. Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. 11140.
97. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 36-40.
98. Id. at 40. Austin notes that in the Island of Palmas Case the critical date was not when the
dispute arose but when it became "crystallized," when the parties "are no longer negotiating or
protesting, or attempting to persuade one another." Rather, they have taken up positions and are
standing on their respective rights. Id.
99. Tao Cheng, supra note 86, at 2642-43.
100. Id.
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that a modem tribunal may be reluctant to address. Claims to the uninhabited
islands addressed herein face nearly all of these challenges.
B. Maritime Resource Boundaries under UNCLOS
Though UNCLOS does not address the island sovereignty claims, it is highly
relevant in regard to the related maritime resource boundary disputes. UNCLOS
governs the allowance of territorial seas and other resource zones associated with
all coastal areas, including islands.101 With research showing major oil and gas
reserves, as well as rich fishery zones, at or near both sets of islands, UNCLOS and
its various authoritative interpretations offer very useful guidance toward resolving
these testy disputes.'°2 UNCLOS allows states to claim four designated maritime
zones relevant to the present disputes: the inland sea, the territorial sea, the EEZ,
and the continental shelf.0 3 Air Defense Identification Zones, as has recently been
proclaimed by China, are not covered by UNCLOS or other maritime treaties. 04
The area beyond these four zones is the high seas, where navigational freedom of
seas prevails and seabed resources are treated as part of the common heritage of
mankind. 
0 5
Where various baselines and boundaries are drawn, in the East China Sea and
the Sea of Japan, will have large implications for the major associated resource
claims involved in the disputes under consideration here. The rights to the
disputed islands and the associated resource rights will likewise implicate the
resource boundaries that emanate outward from base lines. The widely varied
consequences, in respect to various possible outcomes of the island sovereignty
disputes, explains the difficulty of reaching provisional cooperative arrangements
with regard to the maritime resource disputes: as disputants are reluctant to
embrace a tentative agreement that appears to presume a particular territorial
outcome.
Under UNCLOS, baselines are generally drawn at the low tide mark on land
and strait baselines are allowed where the coast is "deeply indented" or has a
"fringe of islands."'1 6 Coastal areas may include islands as base points in a strait-
baseline delineation only where the resulting baselines do "not depart to any
101. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 6.
102. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76; AUSTIN, supra note 95. While all three disputants in the
present discussion have signed and ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has only signed but not ratified the
treaty, though the U.S. long ago proclaimed it adhered to all of its provisions except those respecting
deep sea bed minerals and their management. The matter was recently again before the U.S. Senate to
consider ratification, which key Republicans have long opposed. See Mark Landler, Law of the Sea
Treaty Is Found on Capitol Hill, Again, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-found-on-capitol-hill-
again.html?_r=0. The U.S. lack of ratification no doubt weakens its leverage in pushing others to
settlement of disputes under its terms.
103. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 2, 8, 55-56, 76, 86-87.
104. Peter A. Dutton, Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign
Airspace 103 Am. J. Int'l L. 691, 694 (2009).
105. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 86-87.
106. Id. art. 7(1).
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appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast."' 0 7 Archipelagic states,
which for Japan include the Ryukyu Islands archipelago to the south of Japan
encompassing most of the area opposite to China, are allowed to draw strait
baselines "joining the outermost points of outermost islands.'"'
0 8
Under UNCLOS, internal waters include those sea areas inland from
baselines and the territorial sea and other zones emanate outward from the base
line.'0 9 UNCLOS allows up to 12nm for territorial seas."l0 This applies both to
islands and continental coasts and is fully under the sovereignty of the coastal
state. States are also allowed to claim up to 200nm of EEZ from the same
baselines, where such states have exclusive rights in fisheries and other natural
resources."2 The 200nm EEZ is likewise provided in relation to both continental
and island coasts.' 3 A continental shelf of up to 200nm and, in some cases where
the natural prolongation extends further, up to 350nm, is allowed." 4 Under this
provision, all states, regardless of the contours of their continental slope, are
entitled to at least a 200nm continental shelf, with an exception for opposite or
adjoining states with less than 400nm between them." 
5
For opposite or adjoining states with potentially overlapping resource
jurisdiction, UNCLOS requires parties to reach an agreement "on the basis of
international law in order to reach an equitable solution" in delimiting resource
zone boundaries."l 6 While the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case spoke of
natural prolongation, "17 the adoption of UNCLOS Articles 74(1) and 83(1) suggest
an agreement on "equitable" boundaries; in tandem with Article 76(1), this has
brought about the effective demise of this notion for opposite states within 400nm
of each other. ' The ICJ made this clear in the 1985 Libya v. Malta case, stating:
Since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental
shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever
the geological characteristics of the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no
reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance
either in verifying the legal title of the states concerned or in proceeding to a
delimitation as between their claims. 119
107. Id. art. 7(3).
108. Id. art. 47(1).
109. Id. art. 8.
110. Id. art. 3.
111. Id. arts. 2,4-5.
112. Id. art. 57. Islands are entitled to a territorial sea, an EEZ, and a continental shelf "in
accordance with the provisions... applicable to other land territory." Id. art. 121(2).
113. Id. arts. 57, 60-61, 74.
114. Id. art. 76.
115. Id. arts. 76(1), 74.
116. Id. arts. 74, 83.
117. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Ger. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
118. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58.
119. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 139 (June 3). The case involved a similar
situation to China and Japan, with a continental state (Libya) and an opposite offshore island state
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An equitable solution also appears to take account of proportionality in regard
to the relative length of the opposing coastlines. Jon Van Dyke points out that,
while the starting point seems to be equidistant or median lines, tribunals will
make adjustments, as they did in the Libya v. Malta case, to bring the ratio of the
relative length of coastlines more into line with the maritime space allocated. 
20
Of particular relevance to the present discussion of uninhabited islands,
UNCLOS Article 121(3) provides, "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation
or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf," though such islands are entitled to a territorial sea. 121 A precise definition
of what would be a mere rock is not afforded, though both island groups under
present discussion potentially fall under this provision. 22 Is an island that has
grass and trees growing on it but has never been used for normal human habitation
a mere rock under this provision? There is certainly a policy argument that such
designation would greatly reduce associated disputes.
With little agreement over rights to either the uninhabited islands or the
boundaries of the maritime resource zones at issue, the earlier decision of all
parties to set aside the island territorial disputes and work on cooperative use of
resources under UNCLOS seemed practical. UNCLOS encourages "provisional
cooperative arrangements."'' 23 With continuing disagreement over such islands
and only limited often-unrealizable cooperation concerning resource areas,
especially between China and its potential partners, this approach has proven a
failure. These island disputes, along with disagreement over baselines and
respective rights in the continental shelf, have given rise to the current impasse and
related security concerns. That uninhabited islands are involved, and not merely
(Malta), A state not facing an opposite state within 400nm can sometimes justify an extended
continental shelf based on natural prolongation or appurtenant o islands, as was recognized by the U.N.
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with respect to Japanese claims to uncontested areas
in April 2012. See UN Approves Japan's Claim on Wider Areas, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Apr. 29, 2012,
http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A 1 Story20120429-342721 .html (netting
Japan 310,000 square kilometers).
120. Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. 11[111, 64-65; VAN DYKE, supra note 77, at 59. See also Gulf of
Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14); Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, at I ll (Mar. 16). See
also Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in
the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 1, 319,
available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no 16/1 -
C16 Judgment 14 02 2012.pdf (reflecting that St. Martin's Island got no EEZ based on such
adjustment in competition with an opposite continental land, even though the island was substantial
with 3,700 permanent residents).
121. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 121(3).
122. Sourabh Gupta has pointed out that some very small uninhabited islands have been the subject
of valid or pending claims for an EEZ and a continental shelf, including Japan's low-lying
Okinotorishima, the very small U.S. Howland and Baker Islands, and Australia's remote Heard and
McDonald Islands. Sourabh Gupta, Murky Waters Surround the Rule of Law in the South China Sea,
East Asia Forum (July 20, 2014), http://www.eastasiafomm.org/2014/07/20/murky-waters-surround-
the-rule-of-law-in-the-south-china-sea/.
123. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74, 83.
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maritime resource claims, has also encouraged nationalist passions that give
priority to sovereignty claims and make legal settlements difficult. Compromise,
even in areas where the law seems clear, has eluded the parties, as they fear
surrendering any claim that may possibly serve as a bargaining chip in dealing
with other issues. An assessment of Dokdo/Takeshima and SenkakulDiaoyu
respectively in the next two sections is followed in the third section below by an
assessment of the parties' related resource boundary claims and agreements.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE DOKDO/TAKESHIMA ISLANDS
The competing South Korean and Japanese legal claims to the
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands share much in common with the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands dispute and the disputes over other uninhabited islands in the South China
Sea, even while the historical narrative and present-day tangle of claims for each
set of islands remain distinct. As such, any third-party dispute resolution process
that may be agreed offers tremendous opportunity to establish local legal precedent
in East Asia that may be helpful in resolving other similar disputes, especially
relating to the sufficiency of ancient discovery, the more common-place historical
indicia of effective occupation, and the associated maritime resource boundary
claims.
Dokdo/Takeshima is located in the Sea of Japan (what South Korea calls the
East Sea) and consists of two very small rocky islands and approximately thirty-
two smaller outcroppings with a total area of only 0.18 square kilometers,
approximately 47nm from South Korea's occupied and inhabited Island of
Ullungdo and 86nm from Japan's occupied and inhabited Oki Island.124 The
islands are currently, and have for decades been, occupied by South Korea. 
125
While the dominant view in case law and the literature has generally been
favorable to the South Korean territorial claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands,
submitting the island dispute to the ICJ or another arbitration process, as was long
ago offered by Japan,126 may be more useful to Japan than simply reaching a
negotiated settlement. A definitive answer on the merits can only be offered by a
tribunal with proper jurisdiction. 27 Such a tribunal can help to establish important
legal principles. Such a process would allow the parties to test the water on
various legal issues that surround this and other similar East Asian island disputes.
Such test could facilitate gentle removal of a log from the above-noted log-jam.
As with many uninhabited islands, the historical record to measure the
required "effective occupation" of Dokdo/Takashima is thin, In the face of such
thinness, South Korea, the current occupant of several decades standing would
124. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 46.
125. The Korean Government's Basic Position on Dokdo, Ministry of Foreign Aft. Republic of
Korea, http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/govemmentposition.jsp (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
126. Miller, supra note 73.
127. The concern is to submit the matter to a tribunal with proper jurisdiction which, for the ICJ,
would require consent to jurisdiction either in the case or generally to compulsory jurisdiction. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
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certainly enjoy an advantage. Japan bases its claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima
Islands on the theory that the islands were terra nullius on February 22, 1905,
when Japan first claimed them-under Korean protest-by occupation through a
cabinet decision and proclamation by the Governor of Japan's Shimane
Prefecture.128 After such proclamation, on June 5, 1906, the Japanese government
formally issued a fishing license to one Yozaburo Nakai. 129 Before 1905, Japan
could only claim connection through the private acts of Japanese fisherman, with
official Japanese permission, visiting the islands as early as 1618; this largely
ended in 1696 when Ulleungdo (not specifically Dokdo, which was merely a
stopover on the way) was acknowledged by the Japanese Shogunate as under
Korean sovereignty, resulting in Japanese being denied permission from their
government to visit the area of either set of islands.' 30 Japan does raise the issue of
Korean "withdrawal" from the islands from the 15th to the 19th centuries, during
the period when the region was dominated by the Mongol empire, but South Korea
highlights a substantial level of visits and contacts during this period and its
official re-colonization policy from 1881 to justify the maintenance of its claims
and a lack of abandonment. '
3'
South Korea claims title to Dokdo based on ancient discovery in 512 followed
up by claimed "effective occupation" in the years since.132 The Korean position is
further bolstered by the claim that Japan was bound to surrender the islands to
Korea at the end of World War II, both under Japan's 1945 Instrument of
Surrender and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.133 The relative proximity of
the islands to Korean territory and South Korea's current occupation since
asserting its claim in 1952 and building a guarded lighthouse in 1954-even
though protested by Japan every year-would seem to further bolster the Korean
claim in any close case. 13 4 Though the Korean historical title claims are thin, as is
common for remote uninhabited islands, they appear more substantial than Japan's
claims.
As discussed by the late Professor Pilkyu Kim, South Korea cites a number of
classical Korean texts, such as the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, to support
the following chronology in support of the Korean case: first, the islands were first
discovered-creating an inchoate title-along with Ulleungdo in 512 by the Silla
Kingdom, as inferred from the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms; "3 second,
disputes over the islands relating to fisheries were reportedly settled with Japan
128. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 39-98, 40-44.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 58-60.
132. Id. at 45-50.
133. Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 2, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45. Korea was
not a party to the 1951 peace treaty.
134. While any occupation after the critical date that the dispute arises would presumably have no
effect on the underlying claims, it would seem to at least establish continued occupation and non-
abandonment o the present. See Peterson, supra note 91; AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 40.
135. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 45-50.
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recognizing Korea's sovereign rights in 1696;136 third, two prosecutions, one by
the Royal Court of Korea in 1716 and one by Japan (for smuggling from Japan to a
foreign island (Dokdo)) in 1837 tend to demonstrate a shared belief in Korean
sovereignty;137 fourth, a number of edicts relating to the islands in the late 19th
century in the lead up to the Japanese occupation demonstrate continued Korean
occupation;' fifth, South Korean seizure of the islands in 1954 further indicates
such claim;' 39 and sixth, continuing South Korean control--over Japanese
protest-sustains that claim up to the present.' 40 Kim notes that Japan never
protested Korean actions until 1905-perhaps the critical date.4 1 He notes that a
number of Korean official maps over the centuries, which have shown Dokdo as
Korean territory, have not been challenged.1
42
This dispute has been made more difficult by the failure of World War II and
post-war declarations and treaties to resolve the issue or specifically mention these
remote islands. In particular, the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and
most allied powers, for which Korea was merely a beneficiary but not a party,1
43
failed to expressly include the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands among the listed
territories to be surrendered by Japan.144 South Korea emphasizes that i should
have been included because the San Francisco Peace Treaty incorporated the Cairo
Declaration of 1943, which called for the forfeiture of all Japanese territory taken
"by violence or greed."'145 Likewise, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration stated that,
"[t]he Terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and the Japanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku
and other minor islands as we determine."'
146
Not being a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, South Korea claims it
recovered its territory by virtue of the September 2, 1945 Instrument of Surrender,
by which Japan agreed to both declarations, resulting in the establishment of the
Republic of Korea on August 15, 1945 and its recognition by the U.N. on
December 8, 1948.147 While the failure of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to






141. Id. at 49, 75-76.
142. Id. The author mentions that even a couple Japanese maps have excluded Dokdo/Takeshima
Island from Japanese territory.
143. Minoru Yanagihashi, The Territorial Questions in East Asia and San Francisco Peace Treaty:
Historical Perspective, Paper Presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies
in Honolulu, Hawaii (Apr. 2011).
144. Id.
145. Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Cairo Declaration (Dec. 3, 1943), available at
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46_0011.html.
146. Potsdam Declaration: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (July 26, 1945), in
2 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.: NIHON GAIKO NENPYO NARABINI SHUYO BUNSHO: 1840-1945 (1966),
available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/ete/c06.html.
147. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 69-71.
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connection of the Japanese claim to its expansionist policies in 1905, including the
conquest of Korea, favor the South Korean claim. South Korea's subsequent acts
to seize back the islands from 1952-1954, soon after World War II and its own
Korean War, would further argue in South Korea's favor.1
48
An important related issue, further discussed below, is the likelihood that
South Korea would not attempt to claim any resource zones under UNCLOS,
beyond the territorial sea, thus, making Dokdo/Takeshima irrelevant to delineating
resource zone boundaries.49 Jon Van Dyke notes the near futility of either party
claiming resource zones for these barren rocks, though the Japanese have been
reluctant to explicitly so state out of fear this may affect other island claims Japan
seeks to maintain. 150 South Korea may be less constrained and may move forward
to address related resource boundary issues if it acknowledges that
Dokdo/Takeshima will not have an impact on median boundary lines. These
"rocks" clearly cannot independently sustain life and such limitation would be the
likely outcome of any dispute resolution process before the ICJ or otherwise. With
greater proximity to South Korea, the islands would be on the South Korean side
of any equidistant or median line that may someday be realistically adopted to
delineate resource zone boundaries between the South Korean Island of Ullongdo
and the Japanese Island of Oki.
With much less nationalism at play on the Japanese side for this particular
island dispute (in comparison to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute discussed below),
there appears little incentive for Japan to insist on its claim to the island if any
advantage may be achieved by conceding to a dispute resolution process. Indeed,
Japan first proposed submission of the matter to the ICJ in 1954 and again in
1962."' Rather than surrender its claim, Japan would seemingly be more
interested in engaging a process that may set a favorable precedent in regard to its
other island and maritime disputes. For South Korea, nationalistic sentiments are
much more deeply felt in relation to these islands and have seemingly stood in the
way of its willingness to embrace such ICJ resolution. South Korea has argued
that this is a matter of sovereignty and should not be subject to ICJ resolution as a
mere territorial dispute. 1 2  Any distinction between territory and sovereignty
appears weak and has never been a reason for declining ICJ assistance.5 3 Most
territorial disputes involve sovereignty.
The natural resource claims at stake in the surrounding sea areas, as discussed
below, have lent a degree of urgency to this and other related disputes. This will
148. Id.
149. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Addressing and Resolving the Dokdo Matter, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INT'L DOKDO SYMPOSIUM, supra note 86, at 137-58.
150. Id. at 152-53.
151. Ralf Emmers, Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takashima Dispute: The Interplay of
Nationalism and Natural Resources 12 (S. Rajaratnam Sch. of Int'l Studies Sing. (RSIS), Working
Paper No. 212, 2010).
152. Id.
153. Brian Taylor Sumner, Note, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53
DUKE LJ. 1779, 1779 (2004). See also Island of Palmas, supra note 89, at 8.
VOL. 43:2
2015 INT'L LAW & THE UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 145
hopefully encourage further consideration of the merits of a dispute resolution
process that may bring clarity to the respective rights of the claimants and enable
private companies from both sides and around the world to move forward on
extraction of resources increasingly needed in the region. The post-war political
climate appeared to be improving until the past couple years, as China's failure to
address South Korean concerns in respect to military confrontations with North
Korea and increasingly tense Sino-Japanese relations had brought South Korea and
Japan much closer in their existing security alliance, despite continuing tensions
over Japan's World War II legacy.'
54
The past couple years has seen a shift back toward greater hostility on which
China has sought to capitalize. Of concern to Japan's shared primary security
partner, the U.S., nationalistic sentiment on both sides threatens to undermine their
historical security arrangement. On the South Korean side, such nationalism was
on display in August 2012 when then President Lee Myung-bak made the first ever
presidential visit to the Dokdo Islands and again when South Korea formally
renamed peaks on the islands.'55 The recent emergence of a more nationalistic
Japanese leadership under the Liberal Democratic Party has squandered a great
deal of good will in the past year, as Korean wounds from World War 1I have been
exposed.156 One would hope this situation is salvageable and level heads will
prevail.
V. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS
The SenkakulDiaoyu Island claims pose a greater challenge than the
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute discussed above, with high levels of nationalism at play
on both sides in Japan and China, and an even more contentious relationship
between the parties.157 Despite efforts to avoid confrontation over this issue a
number of disputes arose over recent years before things heated up to the tense
154. Both South Korea and Japan have had shared security arrangements with the United States
since the end of the Korean War and World War 11, respectively, and both host U.S. military bases,
producing a need for cooperation. See Sang-hun Choe, South Korea to Sign Military Pact with Japan,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/south-korea-to-sign-
historic-military-pact-with-japan.html?_r-O.
155. South Korea Renames Disputed Islands, ABC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2012, 12:57 AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-28/an-sth-korea-renames-disputed-islands/4338020.
156. South Korean President Unimpressed by Japanese PM's Attempt to Speak Korean, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/ 1457844/seoul-unmoved-
japan-hails-bridge-building-summitpage=all; Alastair Gale, How Bad Will South Korea-Japan
Relations Get?, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/24/how-bad-
will-south-korea-japan-relations-get/.
157. See CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA'S
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, ch. 3 (Routledge 2004) (dealing with the nationalist politics behind the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute). As China has developed and gained greater power over the past decade there
has appeared a heightened sense of Chinese nationalism over these island disputes. See Erica Strecker
Downs & Phillip C. Saunders, Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu
Islands, in THE RISE OF CHINA 41,42-43, 73 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 2000).
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situation that prevails today.158 Recent efforts to even sit down and discuss this
dispute have been fraught with obstacles from nationalistic sovereignty claims. 159
As with Dokdo/Takeshima, the vast store of natural resources of gas and oil
thought to be in the area, not to mention fisheries, lends great urgency to resolving
the disputes. While the former Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba
appeared to signal, in a commentary in the International Herald Tribune, that Japan
might accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, to which Japan has acceded generally,
China has long refused to accept ICJ dispute resolution.'60 Genba emphasized that
since Japan now holds the islands and has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ it would be open to China to bring its challenge before the court.'
61
Professor Jerome Cohen has argued that such a route would offer several
advantages to both sides, including a cooling off period and, during the long years
when the matter was before the court, a context in which a settlement would be
encouraged. 
62
Short of such an optimal path, there is wiggle room to diminish if not resolve
this island dispute in several respects: first, as discussed above, a number of ICJ
and other decisions in recent years have clarified the law, pointing to the likely
outcome of an international legal decision on the merits;163 second, progress
suggested above for resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute may offer even
greater clarity on the international legal standards applicable to the
158. Han-yi Shaw offers an overview of the past developments and the respective claims to the
islands and discusses crises that arose in 1970, 1978, 1990, and 1996. Han-yi Shaw, The
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C.,
R.O.C., and Japan 13-21 (Univ. of Md., Occasional Papers/Reprint Series, No. 3 (152), 1999).
159. Early 2013 proposals for discussions made to China's new leaders by the new leadership in
Japan were met with an improved tone but also with caution. Nothing ever materialized. Teddy Ng, Xi
Jinping to Consider Summit with Japan over Diaoyu, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/I 136327/xi-jinping-consider-summit-japan-over-diaoyu-
islands; Jane Perlez, Chinese Leader Takes Conciliatory Tone in Meeting with Japanese Lawmaker,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/asia/chinese-leader-eases-tone-
in-meeting-with-japan-envoy.html.
160. Koichiro Genba, Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/opinion/koichiro-genba-japan-china-relations-at-a-
crossroads.html? r-0.
161. Id. China has so far not met that challenge. While Beijing has never agreed to ICJ jurisdiction
generally or specifically over such matters, there has been some speculation that its September 2012
attempt to assert sea boundary base lines to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands may signal efforts to
lay the foundation for such litigation. Teddy Ng, Beiing may seek Legal Solution to Diaoyus Row with
Japan, Analysts say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 15, 2012, 12:00 AM). It should be further noted
that when Japan acceded to the ICJ in 1958 it attached two reservations: (1) that any compulsory
jurisdiction was subject to the other disputant having accepted compulsory jurisdiction and (2) that the
subject under dispute be limited to situations or facts after 1958. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 158, at 128.
Even if China accepted compulsory jurisdiction the second reservation would be sufficient for Japan to
avoid jurisdiction in this case if desired. An effort to agree on such would seemingly have to be initiated
by the PRC.
162. Jerome Cohen, How Dangerous Are Sino-Japanese Tensions?, CHINA FILE (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.chinafile.com/how-dangerous-are-sino-japanese-tensions.
163. See supra Part liA.
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Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute; third, China's rapid development and insatiable resource
needs have brought more urgency to the matter, as has Japan's almost total reliance
on imported energy, now increased as a result of diminished use of nuclear power;
and, fourth, any future Japanese willingness to agree with the position already
taken by the People's Republic of China ("PRC") and Taiwan that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as "rocks" under UNCLOS Article 121(3), are entitled
only to a twelve mile territorial sea and not any resource zones-continental shelf
or EEZ-would surely go a long way to reducing the importance of the dispute.
In regard to the latter point, as will be discussed in the next section below, any
Chinese willingness to revise its own baselines vis a vis off-shore islands may
facilitate such a Japanese move-as these various claims are likely viewed as
bargaining chips in the overall dispute. By the same token, any Chinese perception
that settlements in the East China Sea may positively impact its position in the
South China Sea may encourage a more responsible effort to abandon some of its
more extreme claims in favor of compromise.
On the merits, customary international law regarding such uninhabited island
claims offers good potential to resolve the sovereignty part of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
dispute. It seems likely, based on the various ICJ decisions noted above,' 64 that the
outcome would favor Japan, though this is not certain and only a proper tribunal
could give a definitive answer. The historical title record is much thinner than that
evident for Dokdo/Takeshima. As with Dokdo/Takeshima, the Japanese
occupation and formal claim to the islands date to the turn of the 20th century and
is based on occupation after its determination that the islands were then terra
nullius.165 Japan claims to have acquired title following a series of surveys
between 1885 and 1895 during which the Japanese deemed there were no signs of
Chinese control; they formally took control by a cabinet decision issued on January
14, 1895, by which they incorporated the islands into Japanese territory months
before Taiwan was conceded under the Treaty of Shimonoseki.166  This was
followed by the granting of concessions to and patrolling of the islands from that
date forward. 1
67
Japan takes the view that either China had no historical title for lack of
effective occupation or that any claim they had was abandoned.168 A recent
Japanese media report has turned up a 1950 document from the Chinese Foreign
Ministry archive that acknowledged the island as Japanese territory, a document
Japan alleges has spawned closure of relevant parts of the archive for vetting.' 
69
164. See supra Part IlIA.
165. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 113.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Situation of the Senkaku Islands, JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/a o/c-m l/senkaku/page I we_000010.html.
169. Julian Ryall, Beijing Cuts Access to Documents 'that Support Japan's Claim to Diaoyus', S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/I 141425/beijing-cuts-
access-documents-support-japans-claim-diaoyus; Curtailed Access to China's Diplomatic Archives
Fuels Senkaku Conjecture, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013,
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Japan notes further that a 1953 article in the official People's Daily, five years
after the founding of the PRC, described the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) as
including the Senkaku Islands, which they feel concedes a lack of Chinese
claim. 70
The PRC position is that these islands are historical Chinese territory dating at
least from the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) when they were a navigational point in
the coastal defense system of China and instrumental in its historical tributary
relationship with the ancient Ryukyu kingdom in present day Okinawa., 71 Their
claim is essentially based on discovery plus effective occupation. But only two
acts of actual Chinese occupation before 1895 are cited by various sources: the
islands' use in the 16th century as a navigational point in the coastal defense
system and a one-off grant of ownership to a private party by Chinese imperial
edict in 1893.72 Austin argues that inclusion in a coastal defense system to
contain piracy proves nothing since even high sea locations can be used for this
navigational purpose; while he accepts that a grant of ownership is an official act,
he doubts that this seeming one-off arrangement is sufficient to prove effective
occupation.173 A Japanese researcher has also cited a Ming Dynasty document in
the official annals of the Ming Dynasty (Huangming Shilu) conceding that Chinese
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20 13/02/01 /national/history/curtaiiled-access-to-chinas-diplomatic-
archives-fuels-senkaku-conjecture/#. VFcOGPTF xo.
170. The People's Daily article cited by the Japanese Foreign Ministry is entitled "the battle of
people in the Ryukyu Islands against U.S. occupation." Press Conference, Assistant Press Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Oct. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2012/lO/lO02Ol.html; see also Old China Maps have no
Mention of Diaoyu, Only after 1971 did Charts Lay Claim to Japan's Senkaku Islets, JAPAN TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/30/national/old-china-maps-have-no-
mention-of-diaoyu/#.UsGhvyfRDcx. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MOFA") of Japan frequently
updates its analysis. See Situation of the Senkaku Islands, supra note 168.
171. China's official position is laid out in its 2012 White Paper on Diaoyu Dao. STATE COUNCIL
INFO. OFFICE OF CHINA, DIAOYU DAO, AN INHERENT TERRITORY OF CHINA (2012), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm. The White Paper especially
emphasize missions to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) during the Ming Dynasty to confer titles and
accept tribute involved passage past Diaoyu Dao, as reflected in the mission records, the role of Diaoyu
Dao in China's coastal defense, its inclusion on coastal maps, and the centuries of use by Chinese
fishermen. Because of these tribute missions, Chinese nationalist commentators have gone so far as to
challenge Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa. China should 'reconsider' who owns Okinawa:
academics, Bus. STANDARD (May 8, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/china-
should-reconsider-who-owns-okinawa-academics- 113050800900 1.html; Jane Perlez, Calls Grow in
China to Press Claim for Okinawa, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/20 13/06/14/world/asia/sentiment-builds-in-china-to-press-claim-for-
okinawa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. But China so far has merely allowed publication of such claims
in the official press and has not made an official claim. China not Disputing Japan Sovereignty over
Okinawa, REUTERS, June 2, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/02/uk-security-asia-okinawa-
idUKBRE95 101 R20130602.
172. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 164.
173. Id. at 165.
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territorial claims did not reach beyond the Matsu Islands, and thus not as far off
shore as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 1
74
Chinese writer Han-yi Shaw attacks the Japanese claim that the islands were
terra nullius, citing Japanese contemporary references to Chinese media reports of
objections to Japanese surveys beginning in 1885 prior to perfecting the Japanese
claimed annexation in 1895.175 Such media reportage, however, would likely not
be sufficient to establish title, and the cited instances of reaction to such surveys
may tend to demonstrate the truthfulness of Japanese claims to perfect their title
before their military occupation of Taiwan.'76 There are certainly a variety of
historical claims on both sides that would best be sorted out and evaluated by the
ICJ or another agreed arbitral tribunal empowered to resolve the dispute. There is
also objection that the 1895 Japanese annexation was not publicized until very
recently. 1
77
The Chinese agree that the Japanese acquired full sovereignty of the islands in
1895, but argue this was part of the cession of Taiwan in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, which would give rise to the Japanese obligation to return the islands
to China after World War 1I along with the return of Taiwan under the terms of the
Japanese Instrument of Surrender and the San Francisco Peace Treaty.'78 Chinese
ownership would first have to have existed for this obligation to arise.
Taiwanese scholar Tao Cheng has sought to bolster the Chinese historical title
claim by an irredentist argument that the then contemporary standard of discovery
and claim and not the more recent higher standard of "effective occupation" should
apply, especially in the context of uninhabited territory. 179 The policy weakness in
this argument is that it goes against the likely anti-colonialist foundation of the
"effective occupation" principle,'80 that great powers not be able to travel the
globe, "discover" territory and lay claim with little engagement. A slightly
stronger Chinese policy argument, supported by Jon Van Dyke, is that Japan was
essentially in its expansionary conquest phase when it claimed the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, that the Japanese cabinet decision, even if earlier than the treaty, was
essentially part of the same expansionist activity culminating in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, and that such activity should not be recognized as separate and
174. Chinese Document Contradicts Beijing's Claim to Senkakus, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Jan. 23,
2013, http://www.asianewsnet.net/Chinese-document-contradicts-Beijings-claim-to-Sen-41822.html.
Transcriptions of these records are reportedly available in the National Archives of Japan.
175. Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2012, http://kfistof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-
diaoyusenkaku-islands/?smid--tw-share.
176. See generally Han-yi Shaw, supra note 158.
177. Id.
178. Id.; Cheng, supra note 86, at 259-60.
179. See Cheng, supra note 86, at 224-26. Unryu Suganuma has expressed sympathy for this
irredentist argument in respect of claims from the Asian millennia of Par Sinica, but suggests that
Chinese abandonment after their ancient discovery and claim is an open question. See UNRYU
SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:
IRREDENTISM AND THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS 101-115 (Joshua A. Fogel ed., 2000).
180. See generally Cheng, supra note 86.
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distinct.' 18 If accepted, this would strengthen the case that the islands should have
been restored to the ROC (Taiwan) after the war. The difficulty is that this claim
may simply be counterfactual, if China lacked a valid historical title and the
Japanese can prove a sufficient explanation for the 1895 cabinet decision.
Japan disputes both the claim that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were covered
by the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the post-war obligation to restore the islands to
China. Japanese officials argue that the Japanese cabinet decision annexing the
islands occurred three months ahead of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and was
unrelated thereto.8 2  They point out that there was no reference to the islands
either in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki or the San Francisco Peace Treaty
provisions respecting restoration of Taiwan.183 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also at
some distance from Taiwan, arguing against any presumption of inclusion.
84
Accordingly, Japan argues that Senkaku/Diaoyu is not included in the reference
from the Cairo Declaration incorporated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
requiring that "all territories Japan has stolen ... be restored to the Republic of
China."'85
By Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan further agreed to
temporary "exercise of all powers of administration, legislating and jurisdiction"
by the United States for the Ryukyu Islands south of twenty-nine degrees north,
under which the U.S. took possession of Okinawa and the remaining Ryukyu
Islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands."' The U.S. did not return these
islands to Japan until 1972 under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. 18 7 China did
not protest the failure to "return" these islands to China along with Taiwan
(returned right after World War II) until 1970-after a 1969 U.N. study reported
possibly large oil deposits "'-this may be most damning to the Chinese
181. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 60-62. Jerome Cohen and Jon Van Dyke have emphasized that
Japan fully knew of the Chinese historic claim when they began to take an interest in the islets in 1885,
noting Japanese acknowledgments during the time and the stealth of its cabinet decision, which was not
made public until after World War 11. Jerome A. Cohen & Jon M. Van Dyke, Lines of Latitude, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/japan/lines-latitude/p23364. They also
express concern about Japan's exaggerated EEZ claim. Id.
182. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 168-70.
183. Id.
184. 355 kilometers. Distance from Senkaku Islands from Taiwan, GOOGLE MAPS (follow "Get
Directions" hyperlink; then search "A" for Taiwan and search "B" for "Senkaku Islands"; then follow
"Get Directions" hyperlink).
185. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 170. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the ROC on Taiwan
entered a peace treaty with Japan that largely reaffirms the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
and expressly nullifies pre-1941 treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki. See Treaty of Peace
Between the Republic of China and Japan, China-Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 139 U.N.T.S. 3. This ROC-
Japan Peace Treaty makes no mention of Senkaku/Diaoyu. See id. It was promptly renounced by the
PRC.
186. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 133, art 3.
187. See Agreement between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu
Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 447.
188. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 163.
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position.'89 After such oil discovery, and just as the islands were slated for return
to Japan, China finally filed its protest in 1970.190 Both the ROC and PRC
likewise objected to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971 before the
reversion was completed.191 The first formal point of protest was in 1970; it is
when the legal dispute finally crystallized, and would thus likely be viewed as the
critical date.192 As such, Japan's continuous occupation, including the placement
by Japanese citizens of some lighthouse structures, and frequent patrols since that
date would not prove ownership.193 Likewise, the Japanese government's recent
decision to purchase three of the islands from a private title-holder should not have
any effect on the merits and would not seem to warrant the sharp response it
received.1
94
As is frequently true of remote uninhabited islands, the historical title claims
are somewhat murky, though this seems to favor Japan with both the most recent
concrete claim and current occupation. The weak link in Japan's claim, as
discussed in the next section, is its failure to proclaim that it will not claim
resource zones or strait base lines to the islands under UNCLOS. As an
archipelagic state under UNCLOS Article 47(1), Japan may typically seek to draw
strait baselines to the outer point of its outer islands. 195 On the other hand, if this is
merely an uninhabited rock, as specified in UNCLOS Article 121(3), then the
islands should not be entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf.196 That the PRC (and
Taiwan) traditionally proclaimed that Senkaku!Diaoyu was not entitled to such
resource zones may be some indication of Beijing's assessment of the strength of
their claim, given that the PRC has not been shy about making extreme maritime
claims in the South China Sea.'97 Such acknowledgement by the PRC also opens
the door for Japan to climb down on the issue. Since the PRC is unlikely to agree
to a dispute resolution process or formally surrender its claim, without a clear
indication from Japan on the resource boundary issue the Senkaku/Diaoyu
sovereignty and related resource boundary issues seem likely to remain mired in
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 15 PEKING
REV. 12, 12 (1972).
192. See AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 40.
193. Id. at 9, 40-41; see also Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), II R.I.A.A. 831 (Penn. Ct. Arb.
1925).
194. Japan to Bring Senkaku Islands Under State Control, HOUSE OF JAPAN (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.houseofjapan.com/local/j apan-to-bring-senkaku-islands-under-state-control.
195. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 47, 1 1.
196. Id. art. 121, 3. Bernard Oxman argues this may not be relevant when the rock in question is
already within an EEZ, essentially reducing the rock's resource zone implications to it role under the
rules on baselines or archipelagic lines. Bernard H. Oxman, On Rocks and Maritime Delimitation, in
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW N HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN
(Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).
197. Recent attempts in September 2012 by the PRC to draw strait baselines around the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were roundly criticized by the U.S. U.S. Defense Department criticizes
China's claims to Senkaku islands, JAPAN NEWS, May 8, 2013, http://sinocism.us5.list-
manage I.com/track/click?u-fl 8121 c5942896d3a87491249&id=cedO683cl f&e-654fcbfcc5.
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dispute. If that constraint was removed there may be room for forward movement
regarding the broader maritime sovereignty and resource claims.
If the resources at stake were reduced by virtue of a Japanese climb-down (to
claim only territorial waters) on the resource issue, China may want to reconsider
the value of some form of arbitration. When asked to explain the mention of
international law and dispute resolution in the September 2012 speech to the U.N.
General Assembly by the then Japanese Prime Minister, Japanese officials
suggested that, unlike Dokdo/Takeshima, Japan is in full possession of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, such that they have no reason to approach the ICJ.
198
This statement appears to suggest that if China were to take the case to the ICJ
Japan may agree to appear, though this is not expressly said.
As with the above suggestions regarding Japan's possible handling of
Dokdo/Takeshima, China may want to consider the value of positive precedent in
regard to its relatively stronger claim to the Paracel Islands and parts of the
Spratlys in the South China Sea.'99 A proper dispute resolution process may also
allow both governments time to climb down from the nationalistic pressure they
now experience over this dispute. A third option would be to designate the island a
special international resource protection area without resolving the sovereignty
issue. Japanese New Komeito Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi, during a 2013
official visit to Beijing, offered the more limited proposal of a no-fly zone around
the islands.
200
VI. ASSOCIATED RESOURCE DISPUTES IN THE SEA OF JAPAN AND THE EAST CHINA
SEA
Without question, the tension that pervades these disputes over remote
uninhabited islands is fueled by the competition for associated resources, though
nationalistic sentiments about sovereignty may drive civil society pressures. While
not all the resource boundary disputes in the relevant sea areas under discussion
bear a direct relationship to the uninhabited island disputes now under discussion,
it is undoubted that some seemingly indirect extraordinary claims regarding
baselines or the continental shelf may serve as bargaining chips that make
settlement of both the island disputes and the maritime resource boundary disputes
difficult.
While the spirit of recent years has been to set aside the island sovereignty
disputes and attempt to agree on joint resource development zones, this has proven
difficult on several levels: first, many resource rights in surrounding seas are
198. Press Conference, supra note 170, 1 6.
199. In his comprehensive study Greg Austin favored the Chinese position on the Paracel Islands,
and part of the Spratlys. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 98-158. China has to date essentially refused to
entertain discussions on the Paracel Islands. See Greg Torode & Minnie Chan, China Refuses to Yield
on Paracels, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/article/733189/china-
refuses-yield-paracels.
200. See Teddy Ng, Japanese Politician Calls for Disputed Islands no-fly Zone, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 22, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1133325/japanese-politician-
calls-disputed-islands-no-fly-zone.
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thought to directly depend on the territorial sovereignty rights to the uninhabited
islands; second, at the same time, recent precedent before the UNCLOS
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf raises doubts about resource
claims for such uninhabited islands;20 1 third, perhaps of greater importance, parties
may seek to leverage these island claims against the more extreme claims of their
resource competitor respecting base lines or the continental shelf; and, fourth, a
background of security concerns and nationalism may make compromise on such
territorial sovereignty disputes especially difficult.
202
A. Japan-Republic of Korea Maritime Disputes
In the resource area, the Japan-South Korea relationship again offers the most
promise for moving forward. Though saddled with a difficult post-colonial and
post-war legacy of distrust, robust trade and shared security arrangements in recent
decades have fashioned a trade and security partnership less saddled with the tense
competition evident in the Sino-Japanese case. Except for some recent flare-ups of
tension over Japan's war-time record, shared interest and alignments have
historically fostered a degree of moderation over resource claims. Both parties
have not appeared to openly attach EEZ or continental shelf resource claims to
their Dokdo/Takeshima territorial claims-though this is not absolutely clear,
given Japan's tendency to attach such resource zone claims to nearly all small
islands in its possession.2°3 The recent UNCLOS Commission Recommendation,
rejecting a Japanese claim to an EEZ for an unoccupied island to the East of Japan,
would weaken further any effort to claim an EEZ in such context.20 4 South Korea
has also sought to match the Chinese natural prolongation argument when it comes
to the continental shelf toward Japan, but one may question how serious South
Korea can ultimately be about this in the face of the contrary UNCLOS
jurisprudence noted above.
With a somewhat less tense relationship over past years, the parties have
reached a number of agreements. They were able in 1974 (which came into force
in 1978, well before UNCLOS) to reach two agreements concerning the
continental shelf. one is the only boundary agreement ever reached in Northeast
201. COMM'N ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN REGARD TO THE SUBMISSION MADE
BY JAPAN ON 12 NOVEMBER 2008, para. 20 (2012), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissions files/jpnO8/com-sumrecjpn fin.pdf [hereinafler
Commission Recommendation]. Regarding the uninhabited island of Okinotorishima the Commission,
in the face of Chinese and South Korean objection to Japan's resource claims, refused to make a
recommendation. While this set no precedent on the substantive issue, which presumably would have
to be submitted to a proper tribunal, it did offer a UN based statement of skepticism regarding such
claims. See UN Approves Japan's Claim on Wider Seas, YOMIURI SHIMBUN/ASIA NEWS NETWORK,
Apr. 29, 2012, http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120429-
342721 .html.
202. South Korea has resource boundary disputes with China and even more difficult and volatile
maritime boundary issues with North Korea, which are beyond the scope of the present essay.
203. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 51-52.
204. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 201.
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Asia, delimiting a median line continental shelf boundary in the northern part of
the Korea Strait (named the "Tsushima Strait" in Japan);205 the other is the 1974
(came into effect in 1978) joint development agreement for areas of the East China
Sea south of Cheju Island bounded by the outer limits of their overlapping
claims.20 6  China has objected that the resultant joint development zone
overreaches into Chinese areas and it remains for the two partners to reach
agreement with China.20 7 The Joint Development Zone agreement provides for
joint development of resources from the continental shelf in an approximately
24,000 square nautical mile area where the parties' continental shelf claims overlap
in the East China Sea below Cheju Island and has a mandatory period of fifty
208years.
The resultant Joint Development Zone is mostly on the Japanese side of the
median because Japan is claiming up to the median line and South Korea is
claiming natural prolongation beyond the median line. This generous pre-
UNCLOS Japanese agreement may have inspired China to demand similar
concessions in its resource dispute with Japan, even though UNCLOS now offers
no support in this context for China's natural prolongation argument. With the
respective continental shelf boundaries between Japan and South Korea not yet
resolved this seeming unfairness may require future adjustment in the joint
development zone if a boundary settlement is ultimately reached around the
median line approach now favored under UNCLOS. North of the Korea Strait,
below any area where North Korean maritime claims are implicated, equidistant
lines should adequately deal with the resource boundary disputes in the Sea of
Japan, once the Dokdo/Takeshima issue is resolved.
In 1998, Japan and South Korea also reached a fisheries agreement, which
seeks to set aside boundary disputes and accommodate differences over
Dokdo/Takeshima.°9  The agreement is a "provisional agreement" under
UNCLOS Article 74(3) pending final determination of maritime boundaries and
should have little effect on the territorial or maritime disputes now pending. Since
UNCLOS would favor fisheries access agreements to properly maintain fishing
stock in EEZs, 210 fishery agreements are more easily achieved and may be
sustainable even after resolution of boundary issues. Japan's excessive use of
205. Choon-Ho Park, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, in SEABED PETROLEUM IN
NORTHEAST ASIA: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 19, 19-22 (Selig S. Harrison ed., 2005).
206. Id. at 19-20.
207. Id. at 21.
208. Id. at 20.
209. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korean Concerning Fisheries, Japan-S. Kor.,
Nov. 28, 1998, 1-48295. See Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 28-30.
210. See Marcos A. Orellana, EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, in PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (Mary Ann Palma et al.
eds., 2010); U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNEP IN 2007 6 (2007), available at
http://www.unep.org/PDF/AnnuaReport/2007/AnnuaReport2007 en web.pdf.
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strait baselines continues to pose some difficulty in Japan-South Korean
discussions in this regard.2'
B. China-Japan Maritime Disputes
The Sino-Japanese maritime resource boundary discussions are far more
difficult and clearly implicate the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Japan has long
unilaterally designated a median line in the East China Sea between China and
Japan as the appropriate boundary for both the EEZ and the continental shelf
resources zones. 11 The most difficult obstacle to any effort to reach an equitable
solution has been the Chinese claim to nearly all of the continental shelf between
China and the Japanese islands on the basis of natural prolongation.213  As
discussed above, recent case law in the ICJ clearly makes such an extreme claim
214untenable for opposite states within 400nm of each other.
Another major obstacle to mutual accommodation is the tendency of both
China and Japan to make excessive use of strait baselines. Before the parties can
start discussion around an initial median line, there must be some consensus on the
base lines from which the median line would be drawn. Since Japan's baselines to
the south will be those typical of an archipelago, along the Ryukyu Islands, Japan
is expected to use strait baselines to the outermost points of the outermost island.21 5
Such lines should generally not exceed 100nm and "should not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."' 1 6 This
would seemingly render any attempt to draw a strait baseline from the Japanese
Ryukyu Islands to the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands inappropriate.
The most egregious current Chinese baseline claim should also be dropped:
China's strait baselines to the uninhabited high tide elevation called Dongdao
Island some seventy miles offshore from Shanghai.1 7 It is possible that such an
extraordinary baseline claim is envisioned as a bargaining chip. Perhaps China
may be persuaded to drop this baseline claim if Japan disavowed any claim to any
211. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 44-45.
212. See Peterson, supra note 92; Kosuke Takahashi, Gas and Oil Rivalry in the East China Sea,
ASIA TIMES ONLINE (July 27, 2004), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FG27Dh03.html.
213. The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated, "On the East China Sea delimitation, China
has never and will not recognize the so-called 'median line' as advocated by Japan. China upholds the
principle of natural prolongation to solve the delimitation issue of the East China Sea continental shelf."
Chinese Agency, Tentative Translation of FM's Answers on East China Sea Issue, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, June 24, 2008, quoted in Peterson, supra note 91, at 454, n.137. China has submitted this
continental shelf prolongation to the U.N. in a submission entitled "Partial Submission Concerning the
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200nm in the East China Sea." China Makes U.N. Appeal
for Maritime Claim, UPI, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.upi.com/TopNews/SpeciaU2012/12/17/China-
makes-UN-appeal-for-maritime-claim/UPI-60871355720880/.
214. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, at 35,
39 (June 3).
215. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 47, 11.
216. Id. art. 47, 2-3.
217. See BUREAU OF OCEAN AND INT'L ENVTL. AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. NO. 117, STRAIGHT BASELINE CLAIM: CHINA (1996).
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extended baselines from the Ryukyu Islands to Senkaku!Diaoyu, as well as claim
to any resource zones around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Both claims would
appear untenable under UNCLOS as currently interpreted. If proper baselines
were agreed upon and the parties could identify an initial equidistant or median
line, they would still be left with the question of proportionality.2" 8 This is
important, because the larger hydrocarbon reserves are thought to be on the
Japanese side of the median line.
219
As discussed above, a tribunal trying to resolve the Sino-Japanese maritime
boundary dispute would likely begin with equidistant or median lines and then
adjust such lines to achieve proportionality between the relative length of the two
opposing coastlines and the resource zone allocated.220 The actual Chinese coast is
clearly much longer than the Japanese coastal areas along the Ryukyu Island chain,
which covers most of the area opposite China's coast. Using its natural
prolongation claim, China has sought to claim all the continental shelf to the
Eastern side of the deep Okinawa Trough that borders the Ryukyu Islands.
221
China is thought to be motivated in this regard because the petroleum deposits in
the Okinawa Trough are reportedly the richest in the East China Sea.222 Using the
appropriate equitable solution and proportionality standards, one suspects the
boundary line would still fall on the Western side of the Okinawa Trough toward
China, though a proportionality analysis would bring more resources on to the
Chinese side of the boundary than a simple median line.223
In spite of these interconnected difficulties, China and Japan in 1997 reached
a fisheries agreement, covering areas above twenty-seven degrees north, from a
point about one hundred kilometers north of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.22 4 This
fisheries agreement is rather comprehensive, identifying four fishing zones,
including undisputed territorial seas, exclusive fishing zones within EEZs, shared
zones in EEZs straddling median lines, and high seas; there is also provision for
mutual access to EEZs, fishing quotas, a Joint Fisheries Commission and
conservation measures.225  The exclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu area from
coverage has left a big gap to generate troubled disputes, such as was evident in
2010 over Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen for ramming the Japanese patrol
boat near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and again in the arrest of 13 occupiers in
2012.226
218. See Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. 13.
219. Choon-Ho Park, supra note 205, at 5-6.
220. Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. 13.
221. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58-60.
222. Choon-Ho Park, supra note 205, at 6.
223. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58-60.
224. See Zou, supra note 79, at 132-40; Nobukatsu Kanehara & Arima Yutaka, Japan's New
Agreement on Fisheries with the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, 42 JAPANESE
ANN. OF INT'L L. 1, 1-31 (1999); ZHIGUO GAO & JILU Wu, KEY ISSUES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: A
STATUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDED APPROACHES 5, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ZhiguoGao and Jilu Wu.pdf.
225. Zou, supra note 79, at 132-40.
226. See Tanaka Sakai, Rekindling China-Japan Conflict: The Senkakul
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Agreement over the valuable petroleum deposits has proven much more
difficult due to the value of the resources involved and the troubled boundary
delimitation disputes noted above. China had generally sought to have any joint
development zones located entirely on the Japanese side of Japan's proposed
median line, arguing that the continental shelf on the East side of the line is the
only part in dispute-tracking more or less the pre-UNCLOS resource zone as was
agreed between Japan and South Korea.227 Moderate progress was achieved when
China and Japan announced on June 18, 2008, in separate press conferences, a
"principled consensus" to jointly explore and develop natural resources in a 2,700
square kilometer area in the East China Sea that straddles Japan's proposed median
line well to the north of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.2 28 The arrangement also appears
to authorize Japanese corporations to invest in the existing Chinese-operated
Chunxiao oil and gas field bordering the median line on the Chinese side.22 9 The
stated objectives of this "principled consensus" have not been implemented, and
Japan continues to protest that the Chinese drilling near the median line will siphon
off petroleum from the Japanese side.230 Given the peculiarities of the separate
announcement and continued discussions over full implementation, there is good
reason to doubt that the "principled consensus" rises to the level of an actual
agreement. As indicated in the Japanese press statement, the parties appear to
view it as a principled consensus to work toward realizing an enforceable
231agreement . It seemingly envisions joint resource exploration and possible,
though yet unrealized, shared production.232 In fact, continued discussions broke
down during the 2010 dispute over the Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen near
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
233
Though the process has been too opaque for a clear reading, it appears the
chief obstacles to further agreement have been the problematic baselines, China's
excessive natural prolongation claim regarding the continental shelf and the
dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu, especially Japan's failure to formally acknowledge
Diaoyutai Islands Clash, ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN Focus (Sept. 27, 2010), http://japanfocus.orgl-
Tanaka-Sakai/3418.
227. See SUSUMU YARITA, TOWARD COOPERATION IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 2 (2005), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/SusumuYarita.pdf (discussing how the pre-1982 Japan-
South Korean agreement plays a part in China's attempt to advance such seemingly unjustified claim).
228. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China and Japan
Reach Principled Consensus on East China Sea Issue (June 18, 2008), available at http://nz.china-
embassy.org/eng/xw/t466729.htm [hereinafter Japan Press Release]; Joint Press Conference, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry Akira Mar, Regarding Cooperation Between Japan and China in the East China
Sea (June 18, 2008, 6:25 PM), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm press/2008/6/0618.html.
229. Japan Press Release, supra note 228.
230. See Choon-Ho Park, supra note 205, at 3-5; Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Protests to China over
Undersea Gas Drilling, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 1, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/japan-protests-china-
over-undersea-gas-drilling-022110278.html.
231. Japan Press Release, supra note 228. See Peterson, supra note 91, at 465-70.
232. Japanese Press Release, supra note 228.
233. Fackler, supra note 8.
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that it would not be entitled to resource zones and extended baselines. Agreement
on baselines should be generally achievable through give and take with reference
to UNCLOS. On the continental shelf claims, China has historically argued that
any provisional cooperative agreement for joint development under UNCLOS
should only apply to the Japanese side of the median line since that is the only
disputed area.234  This is extraordinary in that China is using an excessive
indefensible claim against the relatively moderate Japanese continental shelf claim
to effectively say, what is mine is mine and what is yours is ours. That the rather
limited "principled consensus" to date involves resource areas on both sides of the
median line perhaps reveals that the Chinese understand how untenable their more
extreme natural prolongation claim to the entire continental shelf is.
On Senkaku/Diaoyu resource claims, China has already acknowledged that
the islands do not warrant resource zones, though it seemingly has not conceded
the strait baseline point should it prevail in its claim to the islands. If there is any
room for movement it would seem that Japan might be persuaded to abandon
resource and baseline claims over Senkaku!Diaoyu if China were to drop its
excessive baseline claim for Dungdao Island or other behind-the-scenes
"bargaining chips." The above noted UNCLOS Commission Recommendation
rejecting a similar claim for an extended continental shelf would seem to make this
shift tenable.235
In general, similar strait baseline excesses on both sides could be modified in
any deal to achieve equity. In doing so, both sides would not realistically be
giving up anything and would simply be following established international law, as
required by UNCLOS. If the parties could then quietly begin discussions of
resource boundaries based on the established UNCLOS rules regarding
equidistance and proportionality, it would seem that an equitable solution would be
within reach over the entire East China Sea. Japan's dropping of any resource
zone claims for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands might be the proverbial log to be
gently pulled out to relax the impasse. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands should only
be entitled to a territorial sea of 12nm or less.
C. Security Concerns
The seas as a resource also include the maritime role in security and the
question of military passage. 236 In the coastal resource zones, the coastal state
usually has complete control over living and nonliving resources and can limit
marine scientific research, but other states otherwise retain normal rights
237associated with the high seas and air passage over international waters. In this
regard, UNCLOS protects freedom of navigation for military and commercial
passage by ships of other countries through such zones, an issue about which
234. YARITA, supra note 227.
235. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 201.
236. Id. at 26; Y.H. Song, China and the Military Use of the Ocean, 21 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.
221, 226 (1990).
237. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 56, 58.
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China has some objections.'38  Associated military surveillance activities are
usually thought to be protected activity, as it is allowed on the high seas more
generally.
China has especially objected to U.S. military activities in the 
area,39
including hydrographic surveys by U.S. military ships in China's EEZ, surveys
that the U.S. argues are in furtherance of submarine navigation.240  China
characterizes such passage and seabed surveys as marine scientific research, which
would require China's permission under UNCLOS.24 1 While participating in the
Rim of the Pacific ("RIMPAC") maritime exercise, China was reported to be
spying on the so-called "Rim Pac" exercises off Hawaii in the U.S. EEZ, which
raises the question whether China will continue to object to surveillance activity in
its EEZ.242  China's recent proclamation of an ADIZ across much of the area
between China and Japan beyond China's EEZ is thought to have dual purpose of
seizing control over the air above disputed islands and also constraining
surveillance flights through the area.243 The U.S. argues the naval sea and air
hydrographic and military surveys are permitted under in the UNCLOS convention
and that the surveillance flights above international waters are unrestricted.
244 On
that basis, the U.S. likewise did not object to the Chinese ship surveillance in the
U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC.
This question of military passage and surveillance has caused confrontation
between the U.S. and China several times in recent years.245 Such incidents have
included a Chinese air crash and the forced landing of a U.S. plane on Hainan
238. Id. § 3.
239. Mark Valencia, China and US must agree on rules for waters in exclusive economic zone, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1300695/china-and-us-must-agree-rules-waters-exclusive-economic-zone ("[Tihe
deployment and use of any type of scientific research equipment in any area of the marine environment
shall be subject to the same conditions ... for the conduct of marine scientific research in any such
area.").
240. Id.
241. Id.; UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 21.
242. China defends dispatch of spy ship to monitor US-led naval drills off Hawaii, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 21, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1556956/chinese-spy-ship-
monitors-us-led-naval-drills-hawaii; Andrew Erickson & Emily de La Bruyere, Crashing Its Own
Party: China's Unusual Decision to Spy on Joint Naval Exercises, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2014,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/19/crashing-its-own-party-chinas-unusual-decision-to-spy-
on-joint-naval-exercises/?mod=chinablog; Kristine Kwok, China hostility to surveillance may lessen as
it becomes a maritime power, S. CHINA MORNING POST , Jan. 6, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1398413/china-hostility-surveillance-may-lessen-it-becomes-
maritime-power.
243. See Jun Osawa, China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A "Great Wall in the Sky"?,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-
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Island in 2001,246 Chinese damage to sonar equipment on the U.S.S. Impeccable
engaged in monitoring of Chinese submarines in the EEZ off Hainan Island in
2009,247 and the controversy over joint US-South Korean exercises in the Yellow
Sea in 2010, where the Chinese objected to the presence of U.S. warships.24' That
the U.S. has defense agreements with nearly all countries surrounding
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and that it has reiterated the inclusion of these islands as
part of its commitment to defend Japanese administered territory emphasizes the
connection of disputes over the islands and resources to the U.S. perception of
overall security volatility in the area.
249
The combination of the U.S. "pivot" toward Asia, China's increased
projection of power in the region, and the expanded military buildup by Japan and
the Philippines predicts continued volatility over these security issues."5  U.S.
involvement may serve to check Chinese military aggression but it also adds
increased risk of miscalculation.2 1  That China engages in increased military
activity offshore from Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and is sometimes
suspected of using poorly identified fishing boats in security roles, adds to the
volatility of its various island disputes.
252
Some analysts believe China's heightened belligerence, especially with Japan,
may reflect the leadership's aim to create a more confrontational environment in
which to whip China's largely untested PLA into shape.253 Japanese Admiral
Fumio Ota sees Chinese military intrusion into Japanese EEZs, in combination
with the lack of transparency concerning China's military build-up and activities,
as having the highest risk of occurrence among Sino-Japanese conflict risks.
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Query whether this lends support to Japanese suspicions about greater Chinese
ambitions beyond the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa),
which China treated as a tributary kingdom for five hundred years before the
Japanese annexation in 1879?255
VII. CONCLUSION
The above overview has exposed the two sets of island disputes as a cause
that has soured relations between the three protagonists (along with the ROC on
Taiwan and the United States) for the last half-century. This article has sought to
show that a series of contingent relationships between various island and resource
claims have led the parties to cling to various claims as bargaining chips in a
dispute process defined by bluster and excess. As long as the parties were content
to defer resolution of these disputes for another time as they set about the process
of trade and development this standoff or log-jam may have been optimal. But
with increasing resource scarcity brought on by rapid economic development in the
region and increasing security ambitions by a rapidly developing China, this
standoff has become untenable and a serious security risk. If one adds to this mix
the nationalistic passions that these contests over sovereignty have caused the
danger of miscalculation leading to military confrontation becomes even more
evident.
The good news is that these problems are solvable far short of military
confrontation. Since the parties engaged these issues in the early 1970s,
considerable international legal principles have developed either through treaty law
or international case precedent in the ICJ. Such legal principles offer the parties
substantial guidance on nearly all of the contentious issues, including: appropriate
baseline delineation,256 the use of the equidistant principles,
257 proportionality,258
equitable boundaries for maritime resources,259 the standards for territorial disputes
and historical title in the context of disputes over uninhabited islands,26° and the
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Japan, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-
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allocation of resource zones around such uninhabitable islands.26 1 Given that the
past practice of ignoring the island disputes and trying to reach resource
agreements has not worked, this article offers a contrarian view that the island
disputes may be the proverbial logs jamming up the process and recommends that
attention to these issues be prioritized.
Both the island disputes can be taken off the table, either by complete
resolution, as seems tenable in the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, or by abandoning
resource zone claims, as is clearly called for in respect of Senkaku/Diaoyu. An
even better, though unlikely, solution to the latter would be for China to take up
Japan's somewhat ambiguous invitation to present the matter to the ICJ.
Presumably, none of the parties would want to be seen by their nationals to simply
surrender the islands they claim. In the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, the somewhat
lesser nationalistic sentiments on this particular claim on the Japanese side has
allowed Japan to propose referral to the ICJ. South Korea should take advantage
of this opening. The South Korean argument that this is a matter of sovereignty
that cannot be submitted to the ICJ is indefensible. The many territorial disputes
that make up the bulk of ICJ cases in this area cited herein are all sovereignty
disputes. As has been evident in past compromises over fisheries and joint
development zones, compromise is something both Japan and South Korea are
capable of.
With the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute out of the way and a reasonable
willingness to adhere to the UNCLOS requirements to apply established
international legal standards towards agreeing on equitable solutions-including
baselines and proportional resource allocation-chances are good that all such
issues between South Korea and Japan could be solved. It would then be up to the
parties, as a matter of prudence, to favor either cooperative arrangements or
resource boundary delineation and separate development. It could then be hoped
that the approach taken and the standards set may have some effect on the parties'
ability to reach compromise with China on other island and resource issues.
Cooperative resource development should be about economic development and
efficiency and not simply a way of avoiding the equitable solutions specified by
UNCLOS. Having needed resources available for commercial harvesting in the
region may be more important than who owns the underlying right.
It has to be acknowledged that it may be more difficult to reach final
resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu sovereignty dispute. It appears civil society on
both sides have displayed an enhanced level of nationalism over this issue, making
compromise on sovereignty difficult. At the same time, China has long been
reluctant to agree to arbitration for matters of this sort. What may be more realistic
is to find a way to trim back the resource issues that are implicated. This is the log
that can be gently removed from the log-jam if the parties can honestly understand
the bargaining chips they have deployed. The most obvious bargain would be
Japanese acknowledgment that the islands are entitled under UNCLOS neither to
resource zones nor strait baseline inclusion in the Ryukyu Islands. At the same
261. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 121(3).
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time the Chinese side must appreciate that Dongdao Island is likewise not entitled
to strait baseline inclusion. Beyond these two cases, there are other baseline issues
offering room for equitable tradeoffs. While solving the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute
fully as suggested for Dokdo/Takeshima may be an optimal first choice, trimming
back the island dispute to acknowledge resource irrelevance is a good second-best
alternative that would be consistent with the parties' international legal obligations.
Perhaps then designating the islands a joint special resource conservation zone
may diminish the nationalistic sensitivities.
262
International legal obligations, when it comes to delineating continental shelf
rights, likewise clearly require agreement on an equitable solution based on a mix
of equidistant lines and proportionality. The relevant baselines from which these
principles would be applied have also been made relatively clear by UNCLOS
jurisprudence. While both sides would likely have to surrender some of the
resources they would hope for, the resolution of these disputes would surely pay
great dividends in allowing nearby undersea resources to be commercially
developed. The parties would need to decide whether to go the joint development
or boundary delineation route. One would hope the recent improved relations
between Taiwan and the mainland of China would allow appropriate sharing of
whatever benefit was achieved from the Sino-Japanese progress on these sensitive
issues. If trimmed back for resource purposes, perhaps the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands could simply be designated as a joint bird sanctuary with jointly managed
fishing rights in conjunction with agreements concerning adjoining areas, as seems
appropriate for friendly neighboring countries.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that moving forward in Northeast Asia
may provide a more coherent standard for moving forward on the island disputes
in the South China Sea. Some leading scholarly opinion favors China on parts of
the Paracel Islands and multiple claimants on the Spratlys. If underlying
international legal standards are teased out first between South Korea and Japan,
and then between China and Japan, such resolution may provide precedent for a
more fruitful effort to resolve similar disputes in the South China Sea. Pulling
various logs from the log-jam may make further progress in its removal possible.
At a minimum, any party that refuses to follow the clearly emerging international
legal standards, who clings to excessive bargaining chips, would be exposed and
have to bear the diplomatic cost.
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